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Antitrust law has long condemned tying arrangements when they
are imposed by a single dominant firm. However, tying jurisprudence
does not recognize that tie-ins can also occur as the result of a
conspiracy among competitors. Consequently, antitrust doctrine
fails to appreciate the unique anticompetitive dangers of concerted
tying arrangements. After providing real-world examples of tying
conspiracies, Professor Leslie explains how concerted tying arrange-
ments present a far greater threat to competitive markets than
traditional, unilaterally imposed tying arrangements. Because tying
jurisprudence evolved without considering the existence or effects of
concerted tie-ins, the current test for evaluating the legality of tying
arrangements is inappropriately lenient to tying conspiracies. This
is completely inconsistent with one fundamental principle of
American antitrust law: concerted action should be treated more
harshly than unilateral conduct. Finally, the Article advocates per
se illegality for tying conspiracies and argues that greater appre-
ciation of concerted tie-ins can inform the ongoing academic debate
about tying arrangements more generally.
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INTRODUCTION
Tying arrangements, or tie-ins, exist when a firm refuses to sell
a desired product (the tying product) unless the consumer agrees to
purchase another product (the tied product) as well. The standard
definition of a tie-in assumes that a single firm is unilaterally
imposing the requirement on its customers. This is misleading.1
While there is much confusion within individual antitrust doctrines,
the broad contours of antitrust law are well-established. Concerted
action is evaluated under section 1 of the Sherman Act, whereas
section 2 focuses on unilateral conduct.2 When confronted with an
alleged antitrust violation, the first question that antitrust practi-
tioners and judges will ask is whether the conduct is concerted or
unilateral.3 This informs the observer whether to employ the
apparatus of section 1 or section 2.'
Tying arrangements violate this most basic precept of antitrust
law-the distinction between concerted and unilateral conduct.
Most tying arrangements are unilaterally imposed, with no
agreement among co-conspirators. Yet courts evaluate these tying
arrangements under section 1 of the Sherman Act. Because tying
law mischaracterizes unilaterally imposed tying arrangements as
concerted action, antitrust law currently fails to recognize that tying
arrangements can actually be the result of concerted action and that
such tying conspiracies can create a greater anticompetitive threat
than a traditional tying requirement imposed by a single dominant
seller.
Although much ink has been spilled on the problems of tying
arrangements jurisprudence generally, no scholarship has directly
confronted the issue of tying conspiracies. A tying conspiracy exists
1. See Christopher R. Leslie, Unilaterally Imposed Tying Arrangements and Antitrust's
Concerted Action Requirement, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1773, 1783 (1999) (discussing the
presumption "that tie-ins are imposed by a single seller").
2. See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000). The primary exception is section 2's
prohibition on conspiracies to monopolize. Id. § 2. This provision is rarely used, with good
reason. Such conspiracies are easier to prove under section l's prohibition on conspiracies in
restraint of trade.
3. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984).
4. Or both, if concerted action leads to monopoly. See Sherman Act §§ 1-2.
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when a firm that sells both the tying and tied products agrees with
a competing firm that sells the same products that each will impose
a tying requirement on its customers. By entering into such
agreements with these other firms, a tying seller can significantly
increase the anticompetitive effects of a tying arrangement. This
Article seeks to fill this gap in the antitrust literature and case law
by explaining the anticompetitive risks of tying conspiracies and by
advocating a true per se rule for such conspiracies.
Part I will lay out the current state of the law on tying arrange-
ments. American tying jurisprudence requires no separate inquiry
into whether the challenged tie-in is the result of concerted action
among different firms. This is a significant oversight. Part I will
explore the origins of the current legal test for evaluating tying
arrangements and then explain the distinction between unilateral
and concerted tying arrangements. Finally, Part I identifies the
three varieties of concerted arrangements, which are analyzed more
thoroughly in Parts II through IV.
Part II introduces the discussion of tying conspiracies. A tying
conspiracy exists when two or more firms-who are competitors in
both the tying and tied product markets-agree to impose tying
arrangements on their respective customers. After giving real-world
examples of such tying conspiracies, Part II will explain the
anticompetitive effects of tying conspiracies on both competitors and
consumers. Efficient competitors could be kept out of the market for
the tying product, the tied product, or both. Consumers will face
higher prices and reduced choice. Further, tying conspiracies could
decrease firms' incentives to innovate.
Part III shows how current antitrust doctrine fails to appreciate
the anticompetitive risks inherent in tying conspiracies. As a result,
concerted tying arrangements are sometimes treated more leniently
than unilateral tying arrangements-an outcome completely at odds
with antitrust theory and jurisprudence.
Part IV advocates that courts treat tying conspiracies as per se
illegal. After discussing the criteria that the Supreme Court has
applied in determining whether a particular type of restraint falls
in a per se category, Part IV explains how tying conspiracies satisfy
all of the criteria for per se condemnation. Given the severity of per
se condemnation, it is important to distinguish between a naked
2007] 2251
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tying conspiracy and an ancillary restraint that may only appear to
be concerted tying; only the former deserves per se treatment. Next,
Part IV discusses the defenses that courts have considered in
traditional tying cases and explains why these arguments do not
apply to tying conspiracies.
Finally, Part V lays out the elements that should be necessary to
prove a tying conspiracy cause of action under section 1 of the
Sherman Act. While a tying conspiracy plaintiff must demonstrate
an agreement among competitors to link two products, there should
be no need for the additional elements of market power, coercion,
and anticompetitive effects that courts consider in traditional tying
litigation.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF TYING DOCTRINE AND THE FAILURE To
RECOGNIZE TYING CONSPIRACIES
Antitrust law is premised on the fundamental distinction between
unilateral conduct and concerted action. Under section 2 of the
Sherman Act, "the conduct of a single firm [is] unlawful only when
it actually monopolizes or dangerously threatens to do so."' In
contrast, section 1 of the Sherman Act condemns agreements in
restraint of trade if they are unreasonable.' This means that
concerted action "is judged more sternly than unilateral activity."7
As a result, a firm can engage in anticompetitive acts unilaterally
that it cannot do pursuant to an agreement with others. The
Supreme Court bases this differential treatment on the fact that
"[c]oncerted activity inherently is fraught with anticompetitive risk.
It deprives the marketplace of the independent centers of decision
making that competition assumes and demands."8 Because of this
dichotomy, the first inquiry in almost all antitrust cases is whether
the defendant engaged in the challenged conduct unilaterally or in
5. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 459 (1993).
6. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984).
7. Id.; see Jeanery, Inc. v. James Jeans, Inc., 849 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1988) ("[The
Sherman Act treats concerted action more harshly than unilateral behavior .... "); Shaw v.
Rolex Watch, U.S.A., Inc., 673 F. Supp. 674, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("This distinction [between
unilateral and concerted activity] imposes a stricter standard on the conduct of concerted
activity.").
8. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 768-69.
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concert with others. Not so in tying cases. Tying law developed on
a separate track from nontying jurisprudence and, as a result, tying
law does not embrace the fundamental unilateral-concerted
distinction.
Though Congress enacted the Sherman Act in 1890, the origins
of Sherman Act tying law lie in the Clayton Act of 1914.9 In the
Supreme Court's first foray into tying requirements in 1912, the
Court upheld the legality of tying arrangements under the Sherman
Act.10 In response, Congress enacted section 3 of the Clayton Act,
which proscribed those tying arrangements that "substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce."'1 Instead of treating tying arrangements as merely a
Clayton Act violation, the Supreme Court took the congressional
enactment as a directive to condemn tying agreements under section
1 of the Sherman Act as well. 2 Thus, tie-ins are condemned under
section 1 of the Sherman Act because Congress condemned them
under section 3 of the Clayton Act.
These awkward origins of the section 1 tying claim may help
explain why tying jurisprudence developed along a separate path
from other section 1 causes of action. Most section 1 claims grew
organically from the common law on agreements in restraint of
trade. But section 1 tying claims had a distinct origin. Tying claims
matured in their adoptive home of section 1 of the Sherman Act but
they never completely shed the influence of their birth parent,
section 3 of the Clayton Act. And the structure of section 3 was quite
different than that of section 1.
The language of section 3 of the Clayton Act describes a tie-in in
which one firm imposes a tying requirement on its customers. The
statute provides, in relevant part, that
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-17 (2000).
10. Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 29-32 (1912), overruled in part by Motion Picture
Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 515-18 (1917).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 14; see Viktor H. Kramer, The Supreme Court and Tying Arrangements:
Antitrust as History, 69 MINN. L. REv. 1013, 1016-23 (1985).
12. See Kramer, supra note 11, at 1024-30 (discussing the initial tying cases to reach the
Supreme Court after the passage of section 3, including United States v. United Shoe
Machinery Co., 247 U.S. 32 (1918), and Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film
Manufacturing Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917)).
20071 2253
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[i]t shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce ... to
lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods ... on the
condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or
purchaser ... shall not use or deal in the goods... of a competitor
or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such
lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or
understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce. 3
The language is in the singular. It makes it illegal for one firm to
unilaterally impose a tying requirement. It should have been
apparent that importing such a cause of action into section 1-a
statute that deals exclusively with concerted action-would not be
a seamless initiative.
After the Supreme Court brought tying arrangements within the
ambit of section 1 of the Sherman Act, federal courts nevertheless
continued to treat tying arrangements as a unilateral phenomenon.
For example, the Supreme Court in Northern Pacific Railway Co. v.
United States defined a tying arrangement "as an agreement by a
party to sell one product but only on the condition that the buyer
also purchases a different (or tied) product."'4 The definition does
not contemplate tie-ins being the result of concerted action.
Focusing on unilateral tie-ins, federal courts have long con-
demned tying arrangements as anticompetitive. Early courts could
see no good in tie-ins. The Supreme Court opined in Standard
Stations, for example, that "[t]ying agreements serve hardly any
purpose beyond the suppression of competition."'5 Courts and
scholars have advanced several justifications for condemning tying
arrangements. The primary fear is that a firm with monopoly power
will be able to leverage its power from one product market to
another. 6 According to this theory, a firm that controls the market
in the tying product can force its consumers to purchase the tied
product in an effort to restrain competition in the tied product
13. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (emphasis added).
14. 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (emphasis added); see Leslie, supra note 1, at 1793-95 (discussing
how the singular language from Northern Pacific is deceptive).
15. Standard Oil Co. v. United States (Standard Stations), 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949).
16. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14-15 (1984), abrogated in
part on other grounds by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1284 (2006).
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market. 7 Most tying law is designed to prevent the monopolist's
expansion of empire. 8
With the goal of preventing monopolists from leveraging monop-
oly power across product markets, tying jurisprudence eventually
arrived at a basic four-prong test for determining whether a tying
arrangement is per se illegal. The elements of this test are as
follows: (1) there are two separate products or services; (2) the seller
has exercised coercion or has conditioned the sale of one product or
service on the purchase of another; (3) the seller must have
sufficient market power over the tying product to force the buyer to
purchase the tying product; and (4) a "not insubstantial" volume of
interstate commerce in the tied product is affected.' 9 Some circuits
require plaintiffs to show a fifth element, that the tying arrange-
ment had actual anticompetitive effects in the market for the tied
product. 2' Finally, although not enumerated as part of the baseline
test for illegal tying, most courts also require the plaintiff to prove,
when implicated, that the tying seller has a direct economic interest
in the tied product market.2' All tying arrangements are evaluated
under this test.22
Because this test for tie-ins evolved to address unilaterally
imposed tying arrangements, it does not specifically address the
problem of concerted tying arrangements. At no point has the
Supreme Court recognized the unique anticompetitive threats
presented by concerted tying arrangements. The current legal test
thus focuses exclusively on the situation of one seller with market
17. See Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953).
18. For decades, scholars have debated whether a monopolist can employ tying
arrangements to secure a second monopoly. See Christopher R. Leslie, Cutting Through Tying
Theory with Occam's Razor: A Simple Explanation of Tying Arrangements, 78 TUL. L. REV.
727, 732-41 (2004) (discussing various competing schools and theories).
19. See Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp. (Fortner 1), 394 U.S. 495, 498-99 (1969)
(discussing and quoting Northern Pacific); see also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical
Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461-62 (1992) (quoting Northern Pacific and citing Fortner 1).
20. See, e.g., Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale Coll., 237 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 2000); De
Jesus v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 93 Civ. 2605 (MBM), 1995 WL 122726, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
22, 1995).
21. See Midwestern Waffles, Inc. v. Waffle House, Inc., 734 F.2d 705, 712 (11th Cir. 1984);
Keener v. Sizzler Family Steak Houses, 597 F.2d 453, 456 (5th Cir. 1979); Moore v. Jas. H.
Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 1977); Venzie Corp. v. U.S. Mineral Prods.
Inc., 521 F.2d 1309, 1317 (3d Cir. 1975); infra Part III.
22. See infra Part III.
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power coercing its customers to make unwanted purchases of a
second product. Despite the fact that, as explained in Part II,
concerted tying arrangements represent a greater threat to
competition than traditional, unilaterally imposed tie-ins, antitrust
jurisprudence does not yet recognize concerted tying arrangements
as a distinct cause of action.2" As Part III explains, this has led
courts to treat concerted tying arrangements more leniently than
unilaterally imposed tie-ins, in complete contravention of antitrust
law's most basic dictate: concerted activity is to be judged more
harshly than unilateral conduct.
II. THE INHERENT ANTICOMPETITIVE DANGER OF TYING
CONSPIRACIES
A tying conspiracy exists when two or more competitors, each of
whom is selling both the tying and tied products, agree with each
other that they will each impose a tying arrangement. This Part will
argue that tying conspiracies are particularly dangerous. Yet
despite their anticompetitive potential, neither courts nor scholars
have paid any meaningful attention to agreements among competi-
tors to impose tying arrangements.24
A. Examples of Tying Conspiracies
Seeing how competitors have entered into tying conspiracies in
the past provides a useful foundation for understanding the
anticompetitive consequences of such conspiracies. An examination
of tying litigation reveals alleged conspiracies of varying size and
complexity.
23. Some courts have attempted to justify why tying arrangements are analyzed under
section 1 by reasoning that the illegal agreement lies between the tying seller and the buyer
who agrees to purchase the tied bundle. See, e.g., Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang Labs. Corp., 117
F.3d 1137, 1140-42 (10th Cir. 1997) (en banc). The presence of a buyer does not make a tying
arrangement concerted for section 1 purposes, because the buyer neither instigates nor
benefits from the antitrust effects of the tying arrangement. See Leslie, supra note 1, at 1802-
17.
24. Professor Herbert Hovenkamp has a page on "tie-ins and collusion" in his hornbook.
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS
PRACTICE 425 (3d ed. 2005).
2256 [Vol. 48:2247
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First, tying conspiracies can arise in markets with only two major
players.25 One of the Supreme Court's earliest treatments of tying
arrangements, International Business Machines (IBM) Corp. v.
United States,2 s involved precisely such a scenario, though few
courts or scholars realize it. IBM manufactured and leased tabulat-
ing machines that used tabulating cards.27 IBM required its lessees
to purchase only tabulating cards manufactured by IBM. If a
lessee used non-IBM cards, IBM could terminate the lease, a
daunting prospect for any business dependent upon IBM's tabulat-
ing machines.29 Both the district court and Supreme Court ruled
that IBM's tying clause violated section 3 of the Clayton Act.3"
Although the Supreme Court's decision in the IBM case is a
keystone tying case cited by antitrust scholars and practitioners,
less well-known is the fact that the tying scheme began as a classic
example of a tying conspiracy. IBM did not merely impose its tying
requirement unilaterally. In the market for tabulating machines,
IBM had one major competitor, Remington Rand.31 IBM and
Remington Rand agreed with each other to simultaneously tie
leases on tabulating machines to purchases of tabulating cards.
The government had challenged both the agreement between
Remington and IBM as a Sherman Act violation and the tying
requirements of each individual company as a violation of the
25. In addition to the tying conspiracy between IBM and Remington discussed in the text,
the tin can market during the interwar period until the mid-1940s represents another duopoly
in which the two major firms, American Can and Continental Can, apparently engaged in a
tying conspiracy. 2 SIMON N. WHITNEY, ANTITRUST POLICIES: AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN
TwENTY INDUSTRIEs 205 (1958) ("The Department of Justice charged in 1946 that identity of
prices and terms between American and Continental in California markets was due to direct
collusion 'at secret meetings held at irregular intervals' rather than to price leadership."
(quoting United States v. Am. Can Co., Cr. 30323-S ( 20) (N.D. Cal. 1946))).
26. 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
27. Id. at 133-34.
28. Id. at 134. The government was given a special dispensation whereby it could use
tabulating cards that it made itself but had to pay a fifteen-percent-higher lease price for this
privilege. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 132, 137, 140.
31. Id. at 133.
32. The Court explained that the Government brought the suit against the competing
manufacturers for entering into "a contract ... by which each agreed to use that type of lease,
and not to solicit the lessees of machines of the others to purchase tabulating cards which it
manufactures." Id. at 132.
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Clayton Act.33 However, the Court's opinion gave only passing
reference to the agreement between IBM and Remington,' in large
part because neither company attempted to defend their agree-
ment.35 Instead, the manufacturers had consented to canceling
their agreement with each other, but not the tying arrangements
themselves. 36 The Court's analysis thus focused on how IBM's tying
policy violated section 3 of the Clayton Act.37 Most notably, the
Court rejected IBM's proffered justification for the tying require-
ment: that competing tabulating cards would be inferior and would
therefore reduce the efficiency of IBM's machines. 38 The rejection of
IBM's defense of its individual tie-in is the lasting legacy of the case,
not the conspiracy between IBM and Remington Rand that each
would impose the same tying requirement on its own customers.
Second, tying conspiracies can permeate markets comprised of
many firms, unlike the duopoly in the IBM case. The cemetery
industry presents numerous examples of regional markets plagued
by horizontal tying conspiracies among multiple firms. Several
antitrust suits have been brought against cemeteries and their
trade associations for alleged tying conspiracies in which cemetery
owners have tied plots to other goods or services. 39 For example, in
33. United States v. IBM Corp., 13 F. Supp. 11, 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1935). The government
originally initiated suit against four legal entities: IBM; Tabulating Machine Company, a
wholly owned subsidiary of IBM; Remington Rand, Inc.; and Remington Rand Business
Service, a subsidiary of Remington Rand. Id. By the time the litigation reached the Supreme
Court, IBM had merged with Tabulating Machine Company and Remington Rand Business
Service had dissolved, leaving only IBM and Remington Rand, Inc. as defendants. Id.; see
IBM, 298 U.S. at 133.
34. See IBM, 298 U.S. at 135-36, 139.
35. Remington may also have appeared insignificant by the time the case reached the
Supreme Court because Remington stipulated "that any decree entered against Remington
should be identic with the decree which might be entered against [IBM]." IBM, 13 F. Supp.
at 12. Consequently, a cursory reading of the Supreme Court's opinion does not inform the
reader that Remington was a defendant.
36. IBM, 298 U.S. at 132-33.
37. See id. at 134-35, 137.
38. Id. at 138-39 ("The suggestion that without the tying clause an adequate supply of
cards would not be forthcoming from competitive sources is not supported by the evidence.").
39. See, e.g., Baxley-Delamar Monuments, Inc. v. Am. Cemetery Ass'n, 843 F.2d 1154,
1155 (8th Cir. 1988); Rosebrough Monument Co. v. Mem'l Park Cemetery Ass'n, 666 F.2d
1130, 1136 (8th Cir. 1981); Monument Builders of Greater Kan. City, Inc. v. Am. Cemetery
Ass'n, 629 F. Supp. 1002, 1005 (D. Kan. 1986) (reviewing alleged horizontal tying
arrangement between cemetery plots (tying product) and sale and installation of grave
markers (the tied product and service)), affd in part, rev'd in part, 891 F.2d 1473 (10th Cir.
2258
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one case the tying arrangement required purchasers of cemetery
plots to also purchase the foundation preparation work from the
cemetery owner.4" This was not an instance of one cemetery de-
veloping and implementing its own policy unilaterally. Instead,
almost fifty individual cemeteries agreed that each cemetery would
impose the same requirement on its customers.41 The agreement
lasted for over two decades.42
Finally, tying conspiracies can involve more unorthodox tying
arrangements, beyond a simple purchase requirement. In a recent
case, a group of retailers initiated a class action lawsuit against the
two major credit card companies, which had allegedly agreed with
each other to implement the same tying requirement on the
merchants.43 The class action named both Visa and MasterCard as
defendants, accusing both of violating federal antitrust laws in
myriad ways, including a tying conspiracy.44 The tying arrangement
that Visa and MasterCard agreed to impose was in the form of "an
'honor all cards' policy, which require[d] any merchant accepting
any of their credit cards to accept all of their payment cards."45
Accordingly, merchants who wanted to accept payment through
credit cards-the tying product-were forced to accept payment
through the lower-profit debit cards-the tied product-as well.
Merchants made less profit from the latter transactions and would
have preferred to not accept the debit cards at all. Despite their
preferences, merchants were forced to accept the tied product, debit
cards, as the price of receiving the tying product, being eligible to
process traditional credit card transactions.46 More than four
million merchants formed a class that alleged the tying arrange-
1989); Fla. Monument Builders v. All Faiths Mem'1 Gardens, 605 F. Supp. 1320, 1322 (S.D.
Fla. 1984).
40. Rosebrough, 666 F.2d at 1136. Graves have either a one-piece marker or a two-piece
monument comprised of a base and a die, which is the upright part of a tombstone. See id. at
1136 n.1. The tying arrangement allowed customers to purchase a marker or monument from
outside sources, but required that the cemetery prepare the foundation for all memorials. Id.
at 1136. Firms that prepared foundations for their markers and monuments were excluded
from the apparently lucrative market for foundations. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 129-30 (2d Cir. 2001).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 131.
46. Id.
2007] 2259
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
ment foreclosed competition in the debit card market.4 7 The case
settled on the eve of trial, so no rule of law emerged to condemn
tying conspiracies. 4' The district court, however, found "evidence,
direct and circumstantial, from which a jury could find a conspir-
acy. ' 49 And the seriousness of the accusation is supported by the
amount of the settlement: approximately $3.4 billion.5" This
represents the largest antitrust settlement in American legal
history.5'
While there are undoubtedly many more examples of tying
conspiracies, antitrust law does not yet recognize concerted tying
arrangements as a distinct cause of action. Court opinions, there-
fore, do not focus on the concerted nature of some tie-ins. As a
result, the case law generally neglects to consider whether chal-
lenged tying arrangements are the consequence of agreements
among competitors.2 This is a mistake, as the following section
argues.
B. The Anticompetitive Effects of Tying Conspiracies
The anticompetitive consequences of tying conspiracies can be
divided into two broad categories: exclusionary effects and anti-
consumer effects. First, concerted tying agreements can have
exclusionary effects, whereby a group of competitors jointly
employs a tying strategy to erect barriers to entry or to drive other
competitors from the market. Second, tying conspiracies can injure
consumers' interests by limiting choice and by increasing the price
of the tying product, the tied product, or both. The Supreme Court
has long recognized that a unilaterally imposed tying arrangement
can injure both competitors and consumers.53 This section explains
47. In re Visa ChecklMasterMoney Antitrust Litig., No. 96-CV-5238(JG), 2003 WL
1712568, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2003). The complaint also alleged that the policies created
a dangerous probability that either Visa, or Visa and MasterCard as a pair, would monopolize
the market for debit cards. Id.
48. In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 297 F. Supp. 2d 503, 508 (E.D.N.Y.
2003).
49. Visa Check/MasterMoney, 2003 WL 1712568 at *6.
50. See Visa ChecklMastermoney, 297 F. Supp. 2d at 509. The court estimated the value
of the injunctive relief to be worth $25 to $87 billion. See id. at 522 n.25.
51. Id. at 508.
52. See infra notes 114-23 and accompanying text.
53. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 7 (1984), abrogated in part
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how tying conspiracies can significantly magnify the anticompetitive
potential of tying requirements.
1. Exclusionary Effects
Competitors may conspire to impose tying arrangements
because tie-ins can raise the cost of entry into the tied product
market, the tying product market, or both. Tying arrangements can
create barriers to entry into the tied product market. The Supreme
Court has recognized that because the tying seller requires
consumers to purchase the tied product from her, a tie-in "may
destroy the free access of competing suppliers of the tied product to
the consuming market."'54 At a minimum, "the practice of tying
forecloses other sellers of the tied product and makes it more
difficult for new firms to enter that market."5 It is harder for a
competing seller of the tied product-even if he makes a better or
less expensive good-to make sales when one's customers are bound
to purchase the product from someone else. Yet consumers are
willing to forego purchasing the tied product in a competitive
market if their demand for the tying product is sufficiently high. As
a result, the tying arrangement injures competition in the market
for the tied product as the 'seller coerces the abdication of buyers'
independent judgment as to the 'tied' product's merits and insulates
it from the competitive stresses of the open market."'56 The Supreme
Court has acknowledged that tying arrangements may force a
on other grounds by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1284 (2006) ("The
exclusive contract had an impact on two different segments of the economy: consumers of
medical services, and providers of anesthesiological services."); State v. Lawn King, Inc., 417
A.2d 1025, 1041 (N.J. 1980) ("Tying is said to have no other purpose or effect and thus offends
antitrust values in two respects(:) by foreclosing competitors of the seller from fair access to
that part of the market for the tied product which is foreclosed by the tie, and by reducing the
range of choice open to buyers of that product." (quoting LAWRENCE ANTHONY SULLIVAN,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 156, at 445 (1977)).
54. United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 44-45 (1962), abrogated in part on other
grounds by Ill. Tool Works, 126 S. Ct. at 1284; see Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 14 (noting that
tie-ins can "create barriers to entry of new competitors in the market for the tied product")
(citing Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp. (Fortner 1), 394 U.S. 495, 495, 509 (1969)).
55. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 13 n.19 (quoting Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 512-14 (White, J.,
dissenting)).
56. Id. at 13 (quoting Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605
(1953)).
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new competitor in the tied product market to enter two markets
simultaneously, which is exclusionary because "entry into both
markets is significantly more expensive than simple entry into the
tied market" and renders markets less competitive.57
Tying conspiracies increase the probability that tie-ins will
create successful barriers to entry into the tied product market.
Concerted tying arrangements increase the likelihood of smaller
firms aggregating their individually insignificant market power
into a potent anticompetitive weapon. Indeed, tying conspiracies
have the potential to destroy competition in the market for the
tied product entirely. The IBM-Remington Rand tying conspiracy
shows how rivals can join forces to eliminate competitors in the
market for tabulating cards.5" While IBM and Remington Rand sold
both tabulating machines and cards, they faced competition from
other firms only in the latter market. Both sought to increase their
sales of cards, but were hampered by competition. 9 If IBM alone
had required its machine customers to purchase their cards from it
as well, consumers could have purchased their machines from
Remington Rand and their cards from any of the other existing card
suppliers. Remington Rand faced the same problem if it attempted
a tie-in on its own. However, by agreeing to jointly impose the same
tie-in, neither IBM nor Remington Rand customers could circum-
vent the tying requirement, and competing sellers of cards were
locked out of the market altogether. As the district court in IBM
noted,
it is obvious that even if there are no more than two competitors
in a commerce ... and each is allowed to bind the lessees of its
machines from purchasing the tabulating cards of the other for
57. Id. at 13 n.19 ('They must be prepared not only to match existing sellers of the tied
product in price and quality, but to offset the attraction of the tying product itself. Even if this
is possible through simultaneous entry into production of the tying product, entry into both
markets is significantly more expensive than simple entry into the tied market, and shifting
buying habits in the tied product is considerably more cumbersome and less responsive to
variations in competitive offers." (quoting Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 512-14 (White, J.,
dissenting))); see also Silkworth v. Cedar Hill Cemetery, Inc., No. 694, 1993 WL 122104, at
*1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Feb. 11, 1993) (per curiam) ("Specifically, appellant alleged that in
furtherance of a conspiracy, appellees ... sell cemetery lots and monuments as a package, a
combination that a monument dealer like himself cannot offer....').
58. See United States v. IBM Corp., 13 F. Supp. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1935).
59. See id. at 14-17.
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use in its leased machines, the competition in tabulating cards
would almost certainly be not only substantially lessened but
practically extinguished.'
By locking up a significant part of the market for the tied product,
conspiring rivals can prevent other competitors from reaching
the minimum efficient scale necessary to compete effectively.6 '
Consequently, a tying conspiracy could force a theoretically more
efficient potential manufacturer of the tied product from the market.
Once this competition is eliminated, the conspirators can exercise
their power in the tied product market by raising price.
Critics of antitrust rules against tying assert that tie-ins cannot
create monopolies in complementary product markets, and that
even if they could the tying seller would not increase profits by
doing so. First, they assert that tie-ins do not affect competition
because tying sellers seldom possess monopoly power.62 This
position heavily influenced Justice O'Connor, who opined that in the
absence of market power over the tying product, "tying cannot
conceivably have any adverse impact in the tied-product market."63
Without market power, consumers can evade the tying requirement
by purchasing the tying product from someone else who does not
impose a tie-in. Tie-ins cannot create market power if none existed
previously.' Furthermore, critics associated with the Chicago
School asserted that even if the tying seller could force a tying
requirement upon consumers, it would gain nothing by doing so
because the monopolist can only extract a finite amount of monopoly
profits. 5 Monopolizing a second, complementary market would not
increase the monopolist's profits; it would merely collect those same
profits in another market.
The Chicago School arguments do not consider the economic
effects of concerted tying arrangements. Competitors can enter
60. Id. at 20.
61. See Leslie, supra note 1, at 1785-86.
62. See RIcHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw 198 (2d ed. 2001).
63. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 37 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment), abrogated in part on other grounds by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v.
Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1284 (2006).
64. See id. at 37-38 ("If the seller of flour has no market power over flour, it will gain none
by insisting that its buyers take some sugar as well.").
65. See POSNER, supra note 62, at 198.
2007] 2263
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
conspiracies that increase their market power, allowing them to
exclude competitors in a manner that could not happen in a free
market or absent the illegal agreement. In her generally sympa-
thetic position toward tying, even Justice O'Connor acknowledged
that tying arrangements could "be economically harmful" when
"power in the market for the tying product is used to create
additional market power in the market for the tied product."66 While
she asserted this phenomenon was "rare, 67 she did not consider the
possibility of tying conspiracies. A tying conspiracy allows sellers to
create market power in the tying product market and then to
employ that power to injure competition in the tied product market.
A traditional tying arrangement can also be a barrier to entry
into the market for the tying product. A firm wanting to enter a
product market will have an easier go if consumers have easy access
to complementary products and services. For example, it is easier to
enter the market for selling some types of machinery when a market
for servicing such machines already exists. If no service market
existed, the new entrant would have to both make machinery and
maintain a service force in order to assure would-be consumers that
repair assistance is available. In general, if consumers do not have
sufficient access to complementary products, then the new market
entrant may have to sell these complementary goods as well in order
to generate sufficient consumer demand for the new product. A
dominant firm in the tying product may employ a tying arrange-
ment in order to prevent the development of a competitive market
in a complementary service. Thus, the United Shoe Machinery
Corporation implemented a tying arrangement whereby firms
leasing its machines received their service from United Shoe as
well.6" This arrangement prevented the formation of any independ-
ent repair organizations that could fix rival machines. As a result,
any firm wanting to enter the market for shoe machinery equipment
would have to create its own repair force as well. That increased the
cost of market entry. In enacting section 3 of the Clayton Act,
Congress cited United Shoe's conduct while condemning tying
66. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 36 (emphases omitted).
67. Id.
68. See Leslie, supra note 18, at 819 (discussing United States v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), affd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (per curiam)).
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arrangements, in part because tie-ins strengthened monopolies in
the tying product market.
69
A tying conspiracy can increase the risk that tie-ins will pose a
significant barrier to entry into the tying product market. If a firm
without a monopoly power ° tried to implement a tie-in to prevent
development of an independent market for a complementary pro-
duct, and thus force any competitor to enter two markets simulta-
neously, the strategy would fail unless it had the cooperation of
other suppliers of the tying product. Consumers could simply buy
the purported tying product from that firm's competitors and then
buy the complementary products from any available sellers, who
could more easily enter these secondary markets alone as long as
other firms are willing to sell the tying product without a tying
requirement. However, if all major suppliers of the tying product
conspired to impose a tying requirement and thus eliminated
independent suppliers of the tied product, any new firm wishing to
enter that market alone would be faced with the costly prospect of
having to enter both product markets at the same time.71
In sum, the potential exclusionary effects of a tying conspiracy are
greater than those of the run-of-the-mill tie-in discussed in Supreme
Court tying jurisprudence. As with most antitrust issues, an
agreement is more dangerous than similar unilateral action. When
an agreement among competitors forces a more efficient producer
69. The 1914 House Report noted:
Where the concern making these contracts is already great and powerful, such
as the United Shoe Machinery Co., the American Tobacco Co., and the General
Film Co., the exclusive or "tying" contract made with local dealers becomes one
of the greatest agencies and instrumentalities of monopoly ever devised by the
brain of man. It completely shuts out competitors, not only from trade in which
they are already engaged, but from the opportunities to build up trade in any
community where these great and powerful combinations are operating under
this system and practice. By this method and practice the Shoe Machinery Co.
has built up a monopoly that owns and controls the entire machinery now being
used by all great shoe-manufacturing houses of the United States. No
independent manufacturer of shoe machines has the slightest opportunity to
build up any considerable trade in this country while this condition obtains.
H.R. REP. No. 63-627, at 12-13 (1914).
70. If the tying seller already possessed monopoly power over the tying product, it would
not need to conspire with any remaining smaller sellers.
71. In theory, this firm could coordinate with a firm that wanted to enter only the market
for the tying product. But this seems unlikely, and the costs of finding such a business partner
and coordinating the joint market entry would themselves represent barriers to entry.
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from the market, this is a result that antitrust law should unhesi-
tatingly condemn.
2. Anticompetitive Consequences for Consumers
While tying conspirators' competitors suffer antitrust injury, the
tying requirement itself is directly targeted at consumers. So it is
not surprising that they too are injured by tying conspiracies.
Consumers, however, are hurt differently than competitors.72
Consumers suffer at least three related harms from tying conspira-
cies: higher prices, reduced choice, and diminished innovation. Each
will be discussed in turn.
a. Price Effects
Tying conspiracies raise the prices that consumers pay for a
number of interrelated reasons. By eliminating competitors from the
market, the tying conspirators are afforded greater collective power
over pricing in the tied product market. With fewer competitors in
the market, price may stabilize at a higher level even without an
explicit subsequent agreement to fix price. This is demonstrated by
the can industry-in which the two major players employed tying
arrangements as barriers to entry7 3-- during the mid-twentieth
century. The two largest producers netted consistent earnings
during financially difficult times, in part due to "the duopoly
structure of the industry which has weakened price competition in
times of low sales. 74
More importantly, in some markets, an agreement among
competitors to impose tie-ins can represent a form of price-fixing.
Some tying arrangements require consumers to purchase all future
units of the tied product from the tying seller.75 This is often called
72. See Joseph Gregory Sidak, Note, Rethinking Antitrust Damages, 33 STAN. L. REV. 329,
330 (1981) ("But the economic injury that a firm causes consumers by exploiting market power
differs intrinsically from the injury it causes competitors by obtaining, maintaining, or
expanding that market power.").
73. See James W. McKie, The Decline of Monopoly in the Metal Container Industry, 45 AM.
ECON. REV. 499, 500-03 (1955).
74. 2 SIMON N. WHITNEY, ANTITRUST POLICIES: AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN TWENTY
INDUSTRIES 209 (1958).
75. The alternative is one-to-one bundling.
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a requirements tying arrangement. Chicago School scholars defend
this as an efficient method of price discrimination."6 This price
discrimination defense of tying arrangements starts from the
assumption that a seller has monopoly power over the tying product.
In the absence of a tie-in, the monopolist would charge the monopoly
price for this product. This is suboptimal because output is reduced
below the efficient equilibrium, thus creating deadweight loss.
Price discrimination occurs when a seller charges higher prices to
consumers willing to pay a higher price and lower prices to those
consumers with lower reservation prices. Price discrimination can
be efficient when it allows a monopolist to expand output, because
it charges a lower price only to those consumers unwilling to pay
the monopoly price. All monopolists would like to engage in price
discrimination, but it is very difficult for sellers to correctly identify
the high-value and low-value consumers.
A tie-in can facilitate price discrimination by pegging the price of
a bundle of goods to the intensity of usage. In this scenario, the
tying product is a relatively durable product (such as a copier, a
stapler, or a printhead) and the tied product is a complementary
product consumed in conjunction with the tying product (such as
paper, staples, or ink). A person who uses the tying product more
intensely will necessarily consume more of the tied product. So long
as the high-intensity users are also the high-value consumers, a tie-
in can help the monopolist differentiate between consumers with
high reservation prices and those with lower ones. The monopolist
reduces the price of the tying product below the monopoly price and
then charges a supracompetitive price for every unit of the tied
product. Over time, the higher-intensity users will pay a far greater
amount above cost than will lower-intensity users. By allowing the
monopolist to expand output-while still ultimately charging the
monopoly price to high-value consumers-Chicago School scholars
defend tying as efficient."
Ironically, the Chicago School defense of traditional unilateral tie-
ins proves the harmful price effects of tying conspiracies. According
to this price discrimination theory, the tying arrangement allows a
monopolist to receive more for the bundle than she could by selling
76. See POSNER, supra note 62, at 198.
77. Id.
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the tying and tied products separately. The theory assumes that the
tying seller has market power over the tying product. In the absence
of such power, if the tying seller tried to pursue this strategy she
would fail.78 Absent a tying conspiracy, a firm in a competitive
market cannot engage in price discrimination through metering.79
Consumers would not be willing to pay a supracompetitive price for
the tied product, and would decline to enter a tying arrangement
that required them to do so.8° In short, absent coordination among
competitors, each firm would charge the market price for its
products and would not impose tie-ins that raise the price, lest its
customers shop elsewhere. However, in the presence of collusion in
which every seller of the tying product agreed to impose similar tie-
ins, consumers could not evade the tie-in. The concerted effort
provides the market power that makes the price discrimination
possible, thus allowing the conspirators to charge more to those
consumers with high reservation prices."' Consumers will pay more
for the bundle of goods than they would if there were competition in
the tying and tied product markets, unrestrained by tying conspira-
cies. Furthermore, because the competitive price would be charged
but for the conspiracy, the efficient quantity for both products would
already be produced and sold. Price discrimination would not
expand output; it would merely transfer revenue from consumers to
colluders. Thus, assuming that the metering explanation of tying
arrangements is correct, it follows that a tying conspiracy functions
as a price-fixing agreement.
78. Will v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 776 F.2d 665, 671 (7th Cir. 1985) ("It also
may be possible to use tying arrangements to extract a higher profit through price
discrimination. Both the extension of power and the practice of price discrimination are
impossible unless the seller has substantial market power." (footnote omitted)).
79. A rational consumer aware of the long-term costs of the requirements contract would
opt to purchase the tying product without the tying requirement and then purchase all units
of the tied product on the open market. Consumers with high reservation prices prefer
markets without price discrimination.
80. According to Chicago School theorists, a monopolist can overcome this consumer
reluctance by reducing the monopoly price in order to convince its customers to accept the
tying requirement. See Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem,
67 YALE L.J. 19, 21 & n.8 (1957). The situation is different when a single tying seller does not
possess monopoly power, and thus has no ability to charge the monopoly price in the first
place.
81. For an analysis of the use of tying arrangements to create market power, see Kurt A.
Strasser, An Antitrust Policy for Tying Arrangements, 34 EMORY L.J. 253, 266-73 (1985).
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Additionally, a tying conspiracy can facilitate cartelization in
several ways. First, a tying conspiracy can help conceal an underly-
ing price-fixing agreement among competitors. The joint implemen-
tation of tying requirements may help conceal a cartel arrangement
by obfuscating the prices of the individual tying and tied products.82
The Supreme Court has observed how tie-ins can result in consumer
"inability to evaluate the true cost of either product when they are
available only as a package."83 Further, because in many cases
-- especially requirements tie-ins-the tied product may be pur-
chased in the distant future, it can be difficult for consumers to
appreciate the total cost of the tie-in at the time that the tying
arrangement is entered into.' All of this makes it harder for
consumers to engage in price-comparison shopping and less likely
that outsiders will suspect price collusion."
Also, tying conspirators need not fix price as traditional cartels
do. Even if the conspirators do not agree on the prices each will
charge for the tied product, the joint imposition of a requirements
tie-in should serve to elevate the price levels in that market because
each member of the conspiracy has a newfound power to engage in
price discrimination through tying. As all firms simultaneously
price discriminate, the real price for the bundle of the tying and tied
products increases as each conspirator charges a supracompetitive
price for the tied product, even without a separate specific agree-
ment on price among the conspirators. This can decrease the
opportunities for observing the cartel's actions, which is important
because frequent meetings among competitors-to set prices,
change prices, and refine market share allocations in response to
unforeseen circumstances-sometimes lead to cartel detection and
conviction.' By eliminating the need for multiple meetings, a tying
82. See Leslie, supra note 1, at 1784-85 ("[A] tying arrangement can be used to obscure
a traditional price-fixing scheme because the sellers can simultaneously impose tie-ins but
charge different prices for the tying and tied product... whereby the price for the bundle is the
same.').
83. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15 (1984), abrogated inpart on
other grounds by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1284 (2006).
84. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 473 (1992).
85. See 9 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 1712f, at 120 (2d ed. 2004) (explaining how
a seller can employ a tying arrangement to "[d]eceptively understate price").
86. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER MASON, THE ART OF THE STEAL: INSIDE THE SOTHEBYS-
CHRISTIE'S AUCTION HOUSE SCANDAL 352 (2004) (discussing how unexplained meetings with
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conspiracy may reduce the probability of antitrust officials discover-
ing and successfully prosecuting cartel activity.
A second, and perhaps more insidious, way in which tying
conspiracies can facilitate horizontal price-fixing is that conspirators
can use a concerted tying arrangement to stabilize a price-fixing
cartel. Cartels are inherently unstable, as each member of the cartel
can increase her profits by cheating on the cartel agreement (that
is, reducing her price below the cartel's fixed level and selling more
than her cartel allotment).,7 Cartels are much more stable if the
members can find a way to detect and punish cheating."8 Some tying
requirements are structured so that the consumer must purchase
the tied product from the tying seller unless the consumer can find
the tied product at a lower price from another supplier.8 9 In other
words, the tying seller has a right of first refusal. Some scholars
have argued that this form of tying arrangement can be a mecha-
nism to detect cheating within a cartel.9 ° Each firm charges the
cartel price for the tied product and binds its customers to that
cartel price unless the consumer can find a better deal. If the
consumer finds someone charging a lower price for the tied product,
she must report it to the tying seller in order to evade her obligation
under the tying arrangement. The seller caught charging this lower
price will then be subject to punishment by the cartel-such as fines
or a retaliatory price war 9 1-which are intended to erase the gains
from cheating. By giving an incentive to consumers to police the
cartel's agreement, this form of tying arrangement can help detect
cheating and thus strengthen a cartel arrangement.
Finally, in addition to helping cartel members detect cheating, a
tying conspiracy can stabilize a cartel in some instances by reducing
the incentive to cheat. Once a customer has purchased its tying
a competitor were critical evidence in convicting an executive of price-fixing).
87. See Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515, 524-28
(2004).
88. See id. at 610-21.
89. See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958); Int'l Salt Co., Inc. v.
United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396-97 (1947), abrogated in part on other grounds by Ill. Tool
Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1284 (2006).
90. See, e.g., F. Jay Cummings & Wayne E. Ruhter, The Northern Pacific Case, 22 J. L.
& ECON. 329, 350 (1979) (noting that "Northern Pacific's traffic clauses aided in detecting
whether other railroads were adhering to rate and service standards").
91. See Leslie, supra note 87, at 615-20.
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product and has agreed to the tying requirement, each seller in the
conspiracy has little incentive to cheat by lowering the price of the
tied product because its customers are contractually obligated to
buy the tied product from it. After the consumers are locked in, the
tying seller can raise the price of the tied product and has little
reason to monitor the prices of its putative competitors.
In sum, competitors can agree to impose tying arrangements in
order to create, conceal, and stabilize illegal price-fixing cartels. Yet
even in the absence of a separate price-fixing agreement, tying
conspiracies have deleterious price effects by leading to more
market concentration and facilitating a variety of price discrimina-
tion that does not expand market output.
b. Choice Effects
Antitrust also cares about preserving consumer choice. To the
extent that antitrust exists to protect consumer welfare, it rightly
should care about agreements that artificially reduce consumers'
options. Choice serves consumers' interests in many ways:
All else being equal, consumers would prefer having a choice of
suppliers or brands available to purchase. Even if differing
brands are deemed equal in some overall price-quality assess-
ment, individual buyers may prefer one brand's features over
another. Large buyers often prefer to divide their purchases
among available suppliers for reasons that may have nothing to
do with quality or price differences. Over-reliance on a single
supplier is perceived to raise business risks to the buyer. If a
single source supplier has labor difficulties, imposes an abrupt
price increase, has a fall-off in quality, or ... begins defaulting on
critically timed deliveries, the buyer may face losses that could
have been avoided had other suppliers been available and
familiar with the buyer's needs.2
Professor Robert Lande has persuasively argued that "choice-
centered antitrust policy will support and lead to a more efficient
market, the lowest prices, the best product quality and variety, the
92. LAWRENCE A. SULIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OFANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED
HANDBOOK 15 (2d ed. 2006).
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highest level of consumer surplus, and all the other benefits of a
competitive economy."93 But choice is not praised merely by
antitrust scholars; courts, too, have sometimes emphasized the
critical role that choice plays in a free economy, and consequently in
antitrust jurisprudence. For example, the Supreme Court has
condemned horizontal "agreement[s] limit[ing] consumer choice by
impeding the 'ordinary give and take of the market place."'94 This
concern is particularly visible in tying law.
Courts condemn tying arrangements in part because tie-ins
reduce consumer choice. Once they agree to the tying requirement,
consumers do not have the ability to choose freely among competing
versions of the tied product. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
condemned tying arrangements because of their effect on consumer
sovereignty. In its 1953 Times-Picayune decision, the Court noted
that, by imposing a tie-in, "a seller coerces the abdication of buyers'
independent judgment as to the 'tied' product's merits and insulates
it from the competitive stresses of the open market. But any
intrinsic superiority of the 'tied' product would convince freely
choosing buyers to select it over others, anyway."95 Five years later,
the Court condemned tying arrangements, in part, because "buyers
are forced to forego their free choice between competing products."96
More recently, the Jefferson Parish Court reviewed its tying
jurisprudence and noted that invalid tying arrangements had
diminished consumer choice by "forc[ing] the buyer into the
purchase of a tied product that the buyer either did not want at all,
or might have preferred to purchase elsewhere on different terms."97
93. Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice as the Ultimate Goal of Antitrust, 62 U. Pirr. L.
REV. 503, 504 (2001) (footnote omitted).
94. FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986) (quoting Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l
Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)). Not surprisingly, sometimes Justices have
failed to appreciate the importance of lost choice in antitrust. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp.
Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 39-40 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) ("And
in this unusual case, where flour is monopolized and sugar is useful only when used with
flour, consumers will suffer no further economic injury by the monopolization of the sugar
market."), abrogated in part on other grounds by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126
S. Ct. 1281, 1284 (2006).
95. Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953).
96. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958) (emphasis added).
97. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 12. More recently, the government emphasized the
importance of diminishing choice through tie-ins in its brief in the Microsoft case. It argued
that 'Microsoft's binding of [Internet Explorer] to Windows, in short, was pure bolting, which
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While some may argue that choice is maintained because the
consumer makes his decision about the tied product at the time he
enters into the tying arrangement, the Supreme Court has ex-
plained that "from the standpoint of the consumer-whose interests
the statute was especially intended to serve-the freedom to select
the best bargain in the second market is impaired by his need to
purchase the tying product."98 By eliminating the consumers' ability
to choose, some consumers may be stuck with an inferior version of
the tied product. The Jefferson Parish Court noted that when buying
the tied product, consumers "are artificially forced to make a less
than optimal choice" in that market.99 Courts recognize this
elimination of choice as an independent anticompetitive effect of
tying arrangements."°° Indeed, some judicial opinions have sug-
gested that this reduction in choice is the sine qua non of tying
illegality. 01
Tying conspiracies increase the risk of diminished choice. When
markets are competitive, a seller's attempt at tying cannot diminish
choice so long as consumers can purchase the tying product from an
acceptable seller without the tying requirement, and thus be able to
purchase the tied product from any supplier as well. However, a
tying conspiracy makes it significantly harder for consumers to
evade a tying requirement. If a lone seller imposes a tying arrange-
ment, some consumers may accept the contractual term. But those
individuals who wanted to purchase the tied product from another
supplier, or those who would simply prefer not to be bound by a
caused the very harms targeted by tying law: substantial impairment of consumer choice on
the merits between browsers, to the detriment of non-Microsoft browsers and the market as
a whole." Brief for Appellees-Plaintiffs at 44, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (Nos. 00-5212, 00-5213), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/
f7200/7230.htm.
98. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 15.
99. Id. at 13 n.19 (1984) (quoting Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp. (Fortner 1), 394
U.S. 495, 512-14 (White, J., dissenting)).
100. See, e.g., Black Gold, Ltd. v. Rockwool Indus., Inc., 729 F.2d 676, 684-85 (10th Cir.
1984) ("Tying also has an anticompetitive impact on buyers of the tied product, because their
freedom of choice among products competing with the tied product is foreclosed.").
101. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 27 ("Tying arrangements need only be
condemned if they restrain competition on the merits by forcing purchases that would not
otherwise be made."); Roy B. Taylor Sales, Inc. v. Hollymatic Corp., 28 F.3d 1379, 1384 (5th
Cir. 1994) ("(A] foreclosure of choice to an ultimate consumer appears to be the principal key
to a tie that is illegal per se." (quoting Smith Mach. Co. v. Hesston Corp., 878 F.2d 1290, 1297
(10th Cir. 1989))).
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requirements tie-in, would have the option of purchasing the tying
product from a competitor that did not impose a tie-in. Consumers
would have a choice of whether to accept the tying condition and
from whom they want to purchase the tied product. Consumer
sovereignty in a competitive marketplace affords buyers the ability
to select the most attractive deal and to not be bound on future
purchases. In contrast, if that seller were to conspire with its
competitors so that all sellers imposed similar tying requirements,
consumer sovereignty would be nullified. At least one court has
recognized that such a tying conspiracy "limits consumer choice and
the free flow of commerce."' 2 Although antitrust "prevents business
conduct that artificially limits the natural range of choices in the
marketplace,"10 3 this is precisely what competitors seek to do when
they agree to simultaneously impose tying requirements. In sum,
antitrust law should care about tying conspiracies, which necessar-
ily reduce choice more than unilaterally imposed tie-ins do.
c. Reduced Innovation
Concerted tying arrangements also reduce conspirators' incen-
tives to innovate in the tied product market. The incentives for
improvement are highest when an innovator can lure a greater
number of customers to buy the improved product. But tying
requirements can interfere with the market rewards for innovating.
A tying arrangement traditionally prevents consumers from buying
an improved current version of the tied product from another
seller.' 4 The greater the number of consumers that are locked into
their source for the tied product, the lower the potential rewards
for creating a better version of the tied product. Once a sufficient
percentage of consumers are locked into tying relationships, unable
to shop among competing versions of the tied product, then
makers of the tied product will have a marginally lower incentive to
102. Rosebrough Monument Co. v. Mem'l Park Cemetery Ass'n, 666 F.2d 1130, 1138 (8th
Cir. 1981).
103. Lande, supra note 93, at 503-04.
104. See Leslie, supra note 18, at 788-91 (discussing tie-ins that allowed exit to superior
versions of tied product).
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innovate, because there are significantly fewer sales that they will
be able to induce through a more attractive product. °5
A tying conspiracy amplifies any anti-innovation effect of a tie-in.
Manufacturers have less incentive to improve their own versions of
the tied products if a critical mass of customers is locked into
purchasing from them regardless of quality. When a single seller in
a relatively competitive market imposes a tying requirement,
competing sellers of the tied product can still sell their wares to the
majority of consumers who are not contractually obligated to buy
the tied product from a tying seller. But as the number of sellers
imposing tying requirements increases, the number of consumers
able to purchase the tied product in the free market decreases.
While an individual seller may be reticent to impose a tying
requirement unilaterally-lest it lose its customers-the sellers as
a group may feel emboldened to force their respective customers to
accept the tie-in because the conspirators know that consumers
desiring the tying product will have no meaningful choice and that
this consumer acquiescence should also dry up the free market in
the tied product. In short, this high level of consumer lock-in is more
likely to be achieved when competitors jointly impose tying require-
ments. If new entrants are likely to be innovators and tying
conspiracies create barriers to entry, then a side effect of the
conspiracy may be reduced innovation in the tied product market.
Not only does this deter new innovators from entering the market,
but the agreement also provides another advantage to tying
conspirators. If manufacturers know that their competitors have
similarly reduced incentives to innovate, then all can enjoy one of
the chief downsides of monopoly: sloth. Just as Judge Learned Hand
wrote "that possession of unchallenged economic power deadens
initiative, discourages thrift and depresses energy,"'0 6 the collective
decision of competitors to erect barriers to entry, by colluding in
imposing a tie-in, protects them from innovation both by potential
new entrants and their colluding competitors, and thus discourages
their own efforts at innovation.
105. See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 92, at 15-16 ("Preserving consumer choice is also
important because it ensures a market structure conducive to innovation and technological
improvement....').
106. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945).
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3. Conspiracies and the Probability of Tying
In addition to magnifying the harms of tying arrangements, tying
conspiracies also increase the probability that a firm will pursue a
tying strategy. The fact that tie-ins can serve as barriers to entry
provides a strong motive for competitors to form a tying conspiracy.
Rivals in any given market share a common interest in excluding
new competitors by creating barriers to entry. When existing firms
agree to impose the same tying arrangement, this makes any
barrier to entry even higher. 107 If a firm decides that it is going to
insert tying clauses in its sales contracts, then it is better off if its
rivals impose similar requirements. If the consumer objected to a
lessor's tying arrangement, the consumer could not simply shift to
another manufacturer, because the competing lessors imposed the
same onerous condition. Consequently, a firm is more likely to
attempt a tying arrangement if it has some assurances from its
competitors that they will follow suit. Furthermore, because of the
nature of group behavior, a firm that implements a tying arrange-
ment pursuant to a conspiracy among competitors may be less likely
to abandon the tying requirement. 11 To the extent that concerted
tying arrangements disrupt markets with or without a corollary
cartel agreement, antitrust law should discourage agreements
among competitors to introduce tie-ins.
III. THE FAILURE To APPRECIATE THE ANTICOMPETITIVE THREAT
OF TYING CONSPIRACIES
Neither tying law nor antitrust scholarship currently recognizes
the unique anticompetitive risks of tying conspiracies. But this was
107. See William B. Lockhart & Howard R. Sacks, The Relevance of Economic Factors in
Determining Whether Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 65 HARV.
L. REv. 913, 922 (1952) ("Moreover, regardless of purpose, such arrangements may have that
effect. Established firms may tie up so many of the better market outlets that a newcomer
may find it difficult to break into the field." (footnote omitted)); see also In re Visa
Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 297 F. Supp. 2d 503, 515 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) ("As part of
their section 1 tying claim, plaintiffs argued that defendants' exclusionary rules created
barriers to entry in the market for credit card services, thus solidifying defendants' power in
that market and their ability to force merchants to accept their debit cards.").
108. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1315 (2003).
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not always the case. The government's initial case against IBM and
Remington Rand shows some early appreciation of the anti-
competitive risks of concerted tying arrangements. °9 By the time
the case reached the Supreme Court, however, the conspirators had
agreed to terminate their agreement and, thus, the Court barely
mentioned the concerted action between IBM and Remington.
Although the Court notes that
[t]he agreed use of the "tying clause" by appellant and its only
competitors, and the agreement by each of them to restrict its
competition in the sale of cards to the lessees of the others, have
operated to prevent competition and to create a monopoly in the
production and sale of tabulating cards suitable for appellant's
machines, 110
it neither explicitly condemns the agreement as such, nor hints at
why a concerted tying requirement imposed by both IBM and
Remington Rand offended the antitrust laws more than individually
implemented tie-ins.
In the post-IBM world, federal prosecutors do not appear as
concerned about tying conspiracies. The credit card/debit card tying
case shows how the government has mellowed. Although antitrust
class action litigation often follows government prosecutions, in the
case of the Visa and MasterCard tying policies the government's
investigation and litigation followed on the private lawsuit.11' But
unlike the private plaintiffs, the government did not pursue the
tying conspiracy cause of action. There appears to have been
evidence to support such a claim."' The plaintiffs claim was strong
109. However, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) had earlier declined to issue a
complaint against the tying policies of IBM and Remington Rand, though whether the two
firms had any actual agreement at the time is unclear. See United States v. IBM Corp., 13 F.
Supp. 11, 17-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1935). The application to the FTC to institute a proceeding was
made in 1927. The district court mentioned an agreement between the two competitors made
in 1931. If the 1931 agreement was their first agreement, then the FTC would not have had
an allegation of concerted action. Id.
110. IBM Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 135-36 (1936).
111. Visa Check/Mastermoney, 297 F. Supp. 2d at 524 n.31 ("[Tihe government
piggybacked on Class Counsel's efforts. Two years after [the private class] action was filed,
the Federal Trade Commission began investigating the practices of defendants .... Based in
part on this information, the Department of Justice filed its lawsuit against Visa and
MasterCard based on their exclusionary practices.").
112. For example, class counsel alleged that there was "a 95 percent overlap between Visa's
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enough to help lead to the largest antitrust settlement ever. Yet still
the government did not argue a tying conspiracy claim against Visa
and MasterCard.
Even when private plaintiffs do allege tying conspiracies, courts
fail to recognize the distinction between concerted tying arrange-
ments and unilateral tying arrangements. Courts evaluating tying
conspiracies employ the traditional elements for determining the
legality of unilaterally imposed tying arrangements." 3 For example,
courts have employed Jefferson Parish to dismiss or reject tying
conspiracy claims without even acknowledging that the Jefferson
Parish Court laid out a legal test for evaluating a tying requirement
imposed by a single seller, not a conspiracy among competitors to
use tying arrangements." 4 Thus, when reversing district court
dismissals of tying conspiracy claims, appellate courts in the
cemetery cases generally failed to recognize or emphasize that the
and MasterCard's memberships, and virtually every retailer that accepts one of defendants'
credit cards also accepts the other's credit cards. Additionally, as a result of the duality policy,
Visa and MasterCard coordinate many of their policies." In re Visa Check/MasterMoney
Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 130 (2d Cir. 2001).
113. See, e.g., In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., No. 96-CV-5238 (JG), 2003
WL 1712568, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2003) ("The merchants claim that Visa and MasterCard,
acting independently and jointly in a conspiracy, employ illegal tying arrangements that
leverage their power in the credit card services market to force the merchants to accept their
debit cards.... To show that such an arrangement is illegal under the per se test, the
merchants must establish four elements: '(1) that the tying arrangement affects a substantial
amount of interstate commerce; (2) the two products are distinct; (3) the defendant actually
tied the sale of the two products; and (4) the seller has appreciable market power in the tying
market."' (quoting In re Visa Check/MasterMoney, 280 F.3d at 133 n.5)); Monument Builders
of Greater Kan. City, Inc. v. Am. Cemetery Ass'n, 629 F. Supp. 1002, 1008 (D. Kan. 1986); see
also Monument Builders of Greater Kan. City, Inc. v. Am. Cemetery Ass'n, 891 F.2d 1473,
1482-83 (10th Cir. 1989) (discussing the elements).
114. See Monument Builders, 629 F. Supp. at 1008-09.
For example, in Marian Bank v. Electronic Payment Services, Inc., No. Civ.A. 95-614-SLR,
1997 WL 811552 (D. Del. Dec. 30, 1997), the complaint alleged a "conspiracy to impose an
illegal tying arrangement," yet the court applied the basic test for unilaterally imposed tying
arrangements, requiring the plaintiff to "prove (1) that the tied and tying products are
separate, distinct products/services; (2) the seller has 'appreciable economic power' in the
tying product; and (3) the tying arrangement affects a substantial amount of commerce in the
tied market." Id. at **20-21 (footnote omitted). Even though the tying arrangement alleged
was concerted, not unilateral, the court continued to use the singular definition of a tying
arrangement- an agreement by a party to sell one [tying] product but only on the condition
that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not
purchase that product from any other supplier." Id. at *21 (emphasis added) (alteration in




agreement was the violation; instead, the courts simply held that the
plaintiffs had sufficiently pled the elements of a traditional tying
claim." 5
This has meant that courts require plaintiffs in tying conspiracy
cases to prove that the defendant possessed economic power over
the tying product. In its most recent tying opinion, Illinois Tool
Works v. Independent Ink, Inc., the Court stated that plaintiffs
challenging a tying arrangement imposed pursuant to "a market-
wide conspiracy" must prove that the defendants had market
power over the tying product, just as they would if the tie-in were
imposed by a single firm. 6 The Court's dicta implies that concerted
tying arrangements are to be treated the same as traditional tying
arrangements. State courts, too, have required proof of market
power in cases of tying conspiracies. 7 In the end, many courts fail
to understand that a tying conspiracy fundamentally changes the
nature of the section 1 violation."'
Some courts fail to even conceive of the possibility of tying
conspiracies. For example, the Seventh Circuit used language
suggesting that tying cannot be the result of conspiracy when it
opined that "[t]ying is not cooperation among competitors, the focus
of § 1, it is aggressive conduct akin to monopolization under § 2 of
the Sherman Act.""' 9 More shockingly, courts have suggested that
only the agreement between the tying seller and its victim-the
buyer-matters, not any agreement among competitors. In one case
alleging a concerted tying arrangement, the court incorrectly
asserted:
Whether or not such a conspiracy existed, the restraint of trade
which must be proven in a tying case is an agreement, express
or implied, between buyer and seller whereby the latter "sell[s]
115. See Monument Builders, 891 F.2d at 1484.
116. 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1291 (2006).
117. See, e.g., Silkworth v. Cedar Hill Cemetery, No. 694, 1993 WL 122104, at *3 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. Feb. 11, 1993) (per curiam) ("A plaintiff alleging a per se illegal tying arrangement
must allege ... that the defendants possess significant market power in the 'tying' product
118. See, e.g., Rental Car of N.H., Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 496 F. Supp. 373, 380
(D. Mass. 1980) ("Proof of conspiracy in a tying arrangement case would not relieve plaintiff
of the burden of proving the illegality of the tie.").
119. Will v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 776 F.2d 665, 669 (7th Cir. 1985).
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one product but only on the condition that the buyer also
purchases a different (or tied) product ..... Proof of a "conspiracy"
as suggested by plaintiffs would not establish the requisite
agreement between buyer and seller, the gravamen of this
case.
120
The court misses the point of section 1 entirely. While the sales
agreement between buyer and seller may be the traditional way of
satisfying section l's agreement element,' collusion among
competitors is worse than an agreement between buyer and seller.
Indeed, anticompetitive collusion among competitors is precisely
what section 1 was designed to punish and deter.
Such judicial misconceptions of tying conspiracies may make it
harder to condemn a concerted tying arrangement than to invali-
date a mere unilateral tie-in. In the case of the former, the plaintiff
must prove the tying conspiracy and then all of the elements of a
traditional tying claim. For example, when the Eighth Circuit
evaluated the tie-ins imposed by cemeteries, the court applied the
tying per se rule to the individual tie-ins and the traditional Rule of
Reason analysis to the agreement among competing cemeteries to
impose the tying requirements. 2 2 As a result, the court did not
require the plaintiff to prove an actual anticompetitive effect of the
individual tying arrangements, but did require the plaintiff to prove
the anticompetitive effects of the concerted tying arrangement. This
is fundamentally inconsistent with the entire foundation of the
Sherman Act, which condemns concerted action more readily than
unilateral conduct. 12' Although the Eighth Circuit reached the
correct result by condemning the tie-ins and the agreement, 124 under
the court's reasoning it is easier to condemn a unilaterally imposed
tying arrangement than a concerted tying arrangement.
The remedies pursued and imposed in tying conspiracy cases also
indicate the prosecutors' and judiciary's failure to appreciate the
120. Abercrombie v. Lum's Inc., 345 F. Supp. 387, 391 (S.D. Fla. 1972) (alteration in
original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)).
121. See, e.g., Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang Labs. Corp., 117 F.3d 1137, 1145 (10th Cir. 1997)
(en banc).
122. Rosebrough Monument Co. v. Mem'l Park Cemetery Ass'n, 666 F.2d 1130, 1137 n.4
(8th Cir. 1981).
123. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
124. Rosebrough Monument, 666 F.2d at 1146.
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anticompetitive effects wrought by concerted tying arrangements.
The government did not seek damages against IBM and Remington
Rand for conspiring to tie tabulating machines to tabulating
cards. Instead, a simple consent decree was entered into. Even in
Rosebrough Monument, a case in which the plaintiff prevailed on
liability, 125 the Eighth Circuit ordered only nominal damages of $1
trebled to $3.12 Instead, the plaintiff received injunctive relief.121
But injunctive relief does not disgorge ill-gotten gains. The results
in IBM and Rosebrough Monument make tying conspiracies appear
cost-beneficial: constrain competition by colluding to tie and then
stop when challenged. Neither of these cases demonstrates a serious
approach to concerted tying arrangements.
A major problem in getting courts and scholars to take tying
conspiracies more seriously has been the Chicago School-influenced
assumptions about marketplace efficiency. Some courts conclude
that if an industry is characterized by sellers imposing similar tying
clauses, then the tying arrangement must be efficient. For example,
some judges assume that the presence of multiple tying arrange-
ments "implies strong net efficiencies.' ' 128 The assumption is that a
firm would not adopt a particular marketing strategy unless it was
efficient. Although an individual firm may make a miscalculation,
multiple firms in an industry are unlikely to do so. So it follows
that when most of the major players in a market are pursuing
tying strategies, tie-ins must be efficient. Unfortunately, this line
of reasoning makes a critical assumption: each firm unilaterally
decided to impose a tying requirement.
Ubiquity can be evidence of either efficiency or collusion.
Concerted tying arrangements can be profit-maximizing for each
conspirator. The fact that many firms in an industry have imposed
similar tying requirements is as consistent with cartel behavior as
it is with the efficiency hypothesis. The presence of multiple tie-ins
in a market may be evidence of concerted action in the same way
125. Id. at 1130.
126. Id. at 1147; see Rosebrough Monument Co. v. Meml Park Cemetery Ass'n, 736 F.2d
441, 443 (8th Cir. 1984).
127. Rosebrough Monument, 666 F.2d at 1147-48; see Rosebrough Monument, 736 F.2d at
443 (modifying the injunctive relief).
128. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 88 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam)
('[B]undling by all competitive firms implies strong net efficiencies.").
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that uniform price hikes are ubiquitous in cartelized markets. The
assumption that ubiquity proves efficiency is inconsistent with
the entire purpose of section 1 of the Sherman Act: to condemn
agreements among competitors to pursue anticompetitive policies
in unison. Courts would not conclude that uniform, lock-step in-
creases in price prove that price increases must be efficient. Instead,
if such an action is done pursuant to an agreement, the firms have
committed a felony and should be sentenced to up to ten years in
prison."'
Of course, the mere fact that competing firms have imposed
similar tying requirements is insufficient to establish an agreement
in restraint of trade. Even if each firm is aware that its competitors
are imposing tie-ins, conscious parallelism alone does not prove an
agreement in restraint of trade.13° The plaintiff must also show the
presence of "plus factors," factors that support the inference that
firms adopted the same policies pursuant to an agreement. 13 The
same plus factors that are sufficient to establish an agreement to fix
prices should be relevant to proving an agreement between competi-
tors to impose tying arrangements. Indeed, one of the traditional
plus factors may be present as a matter of course in tying cases:
whether the parallel conduct represents a radical change in
policy.3 2 In contrast to price fluctuations, which are inherent in all
markets, the sudden imposition of tying clauses by market partici-
pants is a strong plus factor. But more than one plus factor is
required: For example, did the competing firms impose or announce
their tying policies at the same time? Was there evidence of
communications between the alleged conspirators? Finally, most
importantly, would the change in policy be irrational if adopted
unilaterally, or does it only make sense in the context of a conspir-
acy among competitors?
129. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
130. See, e.g., Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 1438, 1456 (11th Cir. 1991).
131. Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp., 203 F.3d 1028, 1033 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing
In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 122 (3d Cir. 1999)); Wallace v. Bank of
Bartlett, 55 F.3d 1166, 1168 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Todorov, 921 F.2d at 1456).
132. See, e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 222 (1939).
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IV. THE PROPER LEGAL TREATMENT OF TYING CONSPIRACIES
Antitrust jurisprudence should reflect the heightened anti-
competitive threats posed by concerted tying arrangements by
condemning them more swiftly than traditional unilaterally
imposed tying arrangements. While the latter are nominally per se
illegal, tying conspiracies should be truly per se illegal.
A. Per Se Principles
Courts generally employ one of three modes of analysis when
determining whether a challenged agreement violates section 1 of
the Sherman Act: the per se rule, the Rule of Reason, or the
abbreviated Rule of Reason, also known as "quick look." Once a
court concludes that a challenged agreement falls in a per se
category, it relieves the plaintiff of having to prove the actual
anticompetitive effects of the defendant's conduct. If an agreement
is not per se illegal, it can still violate section 1 if the court
-applying either the full-blown or abbreviated rule of rea-
son-determines that the agreement's anticompetitive effects
outweigh any procompetitive redeeming virtues.
Although the Supreme Court has never laid down a clear rule of
law for what conduct falls in the per se category, it has articulated
several principles for when agreements are per se illegal. First,
per se condemnation is reserved for concerted action "that would
always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease
output."'33 In its most recent pronouncement on the subject, the
Court noted that "[p]er se liability is reserved for only those
agreements that are 'so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate
study of the industry is needed to establish their illegality.' 134
Second, the per se rule is supposed to be based on judicial
experience. The Court has explained that "[i]t is only after consider-
able experience with certain business relationships that courts
classify them as per se violations of the Sherman Act.' 13' The per se
133. Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284,289-90
(1985) (quoting Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979)).
134. Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 126 S. Ct. 1276,1279 (2006) (quoting Nat'l Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs
v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)).
135. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972); see Broad. Music,
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rule is essentially a prediction about what would happen if the court
applied a Rule of Reason to the type of restraint at issue.'36 As the
Court explained in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society,
"[o]nce experience with a particular kind of restraint enables the
Court to predict with confidence that the Rule of Reason will con-
demn it, it has applied a conclusive presumption that the restraint
is unreasonable.""13 Conversely, the Court has reasoned that a lack
of judicial experience can save an agreement from per se condemna-
tion, leaving the restraint to be evaluated under the Rule of
Reason.13 The Court has also held that experience acquired after a
type of agreement has earned the per se label can justify removing
a particular restraint from the per se category.1
39
Third, courts consider whether the category of restraint likely has
countervailing procompetitive features that warrant closer examina-
tion. In describing those agreements subject to per se condemnation,
the Justices have reasoned that "there are certain agreements or
practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition
and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be
441 U.S. at 9 (quoting Topco).
136. Nw. Power Prods., Inc. v. Omark Indus., Inc., 576 F.2d 83, 88 (5th Cir. 1978) ('The
usual assumption is that a per se rule would grow out of a history of Rule of Reason cases all
arriving at the same verdict.").
137. 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982); see also State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (quoting
Maricopa County); Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 342 (1990) (same);
FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 433 (1990) (same).
The abbreviated Rule of Reason is based on experience as well. See Cal. Dental Ass'n v.
FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999) ('The object is to see whether the experience of the market has
been so clear, or necessarily will be, that a confident conclusion about the principal tendency
of a restriction will follow from a quick (or at least quicker) look, in place of a more sedulous
one.").
138. See, e.g., Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 10 ("[E]xperience hardly counsels that we should
outlaw the blanket license as a per se restraint of trade."); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United
States, 288 U.S. 344, 377 (1933) ("Nothing in theory or experience indicates that the selection
of a common selling agency to represent a number of producers should be deemed to be more
abnormal than the formation of a huge corporation bringing various independent units into
one ownership."); cf. Natl Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. 85, 100 (1984) ("[W]e have decided that it would be inappropriate to apply a per se rule
to this case. This decision is not based on a lack of judicial experience with this type of
arrangement ....").
139. Cont T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 48-49 (1977) (removing nonprice
vertical restraints from per se condemnation, arguing that "[iun our view, the experience of
the past 10 years should be brought to bear on this subject of considerable commercial
importance"); see State Oil, 522 U.S. at 13-14 (quoting Continental T.V. and invoking
experience to remove vertical maximum price-fixing from per se category).
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unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to
the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their
use."14 Stated another way, Justice O'Connor argued that the per
se rule's sweeping prohibition of a particular category of restraint
is only appropriate "when there is very little loss to society from
banning a restraint altogether." '' The judicial experience often
involves an understanding that the particular category of restraint
empirically lacks a legitimate business justification unrelated to the
suppression of competition.'42
Fourth, the characteristics of the challenged restraint are
important in determining whether to impose per se liability. Courts
are more willing to place a restraint in the per se category when the
agreement is horizontal, that is, between competitors.'43 Vertical
agreements are evaluated under the Rule of Reason, 44 with the
exception of vertical minimum price-fixing.'45 Agreements on price
are much more likely to be condemned under the per se rule than
concerted action without price agreements.
146
Finally, the Court has on occasion exhibited a hesitance to expand
per se rules. Most notably, the Court has repeatedly "expressed
reluctance to adopt per se rules ... 'where the economic impact of
certain practices is not immediately obvious.""47 The shift of
nonprice vertical restraints4 ' and vertical maximum price-fixing'49
out of the per se rule and into Rule of Reason analysis also reflects
140. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (emphasis added).
141. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 33-34 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment), abrogated in part on other grounds by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v.
Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1284 (2006).
142. See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 265 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) ("Specifically, the per se rule of prohibition has been applied to price-fixing
agreements, group boycotts, tying arrangements, and horizontal divisions of markets. As to
each of these practices, experience and analysis have established the utter lack of justification
to excuse its inherent threat to competition.").
143. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972).
144. See Cont7 T.V, 433 U.S. at 59.
145. See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408 (1911).
146. See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 735-36 (1988).
147. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (quoting FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists,
476 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1986)); see Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 126 S. Ct. 1276, 1279 (2006) (quoting
State Oil).
148. Cont'l T.V., Inc., 433 U.S. at 59.
149. State Oil Co., 522 U.S. at 22.
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a judicial ambivalence about per se condemnation when the
anticompetitive effects of agreements are unclear. 5 °
B. The Case for Condemning Tying Conspiracies as Per Se Illegal
There is not an established rule in antitrust law that agreements
among competitors to impose tie-ins are per se illegal. 15' Without
explanation, courts have applied Rule of Reason analysis to tying
conspiracies, not explaining why they were not using per se
analysis.'52 This Section explains why antitrust jurisprudence and
logic both counsel in favor of condemning tying conspiracies as per
se illegal.
The failure to condemn tying conspiracies as per se illegal seems
odd because they have all of the hallmarks of per se illegal conduct.
First, tying conspiracies "always or almost always tend to restrict
competition and decrease output" in the market for the tied
product.'53 As explained in Part II, agreements among competitors
to impose tying requirements have a pernicious effect on competi-
tion by erecting barriers to entry into both the tying and tied
product markets.' Tying conspiracies subject consumers to
150. See State v. Lawn King, Inc., 417 A.2d 1025, 1034 (N.J. 1980) ('"The general thrust of
the subsequent decisions interpreting Sylvania is that the Supreme Court's ruling in that case
'evinces judicial reluctance to extend per se rules under [the Sherman Act]." (quoting Magnus
Petroleum Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 599 F.2d 196, 204 (7th Cir. 1979)) (alteration in original)).
151. Declaration of Professor Harry First, In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig.,
No. CV-96-5238 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2003). In theory, the lack of a clear per se rule against
tying conspiracies makes it more difficult for antitrust plaintiffs to initiate litigation with
confidence, particularly in the context of class action lawsuits in which class counsel needs
to represent a strong possibility of prevailing at trial in order to put more pressure on
antitrust defendants to increase settlement offers. This does not appear to have been a
significant problem in In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litigation, in which the class
counsel negotiated a multibillion settlement when one of the claims included allegations of
a concerted tying arrangement. In re Visa ChecklMasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124,
129, 136 (2d Cir. 2001).
152. See Rosebrough Monument Co. v. Meml Park Cemetery Ass'n, 666 F.2d 1130, 1137
n.4 (8th Cir. 1981) (employing traditional Rule of Reason analysis).
153. Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289-90
(1985) (quoting Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979)).
154. In theory, there can be competition at the level of the bundled package. But
competition among bundles does not solve the barriers to entry problem. First, the conspiracy
excludes from the market those sellers who do not sell both products. Second, the bundle may
not be the relevant level of competition because consumers may want to purchase the tying
product from one supplier and the tied product from another (who has been eliminated from
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unwanted contract terms that cannot be avoided since rival firms
have conspired to impose the same onerous tying requirements.
Such conspiracies often increase the total price that consumers pay
for bundled goods, and they may stabilize and help conceal secret
cartel agreements, which are themselves per se illegal.
Tying conspiracies resemble other per se illegal categories of
conduct. For example, horizontal price-fixing agreements are per se
illegal. 5 Tying conspiracies operate as a price-fixing mechanism. A
higher price for the tied product is often being imposed on consum-
ers pursuant to a horizontal agreement. Further, to the extent that
a horizontal tying conspiracy operates as an agreement to jointly
price discriminate, 5 6 it warrants per se condemnation as well.'57
Firms cannot agree to charge high prices to high-volume purchasers
and lower prices to low-volume purchasers. The Supreme Court has
recognized that per se illegal price-fixing can take a variety of forms
beyond mere agreement among competitors to charge a specific
price, including agreements not to extend credit56 and agreements
to remove surplus products from the market.5 9 Tying conspiracies
should be added to this list.
A tying conspiracy can also be analogous to customer division.
Horizontal agreements to allocate customers are per se illegal. 6 °
the market by the conspiracy). Or, they may want to purchase only the tying product and not
the tied product at all. Third, consumers are denied the ability to construct their own bundles.
Antitrust law does not allow competitors to get together and decide what consumers should
want; consumers do this through the marketplace. See FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S.
447, 459 (1986); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 610-11
(1985); Natl Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 694-96 (1978).
155. See Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 650 (1980); United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223-24 (1940); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.,
273 U.S. 392, 400-02 (1927).
156. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
157. See Zoslaw v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 533 F. Supp. 540, 553 (N.D. Cal. 1980) ("In
the absence of a horizontal conspiracy to charge different prices or a vertical agreement to
exclude competitors, price discrimination does not support a claim under section 1 of the
Sherman Act."), affd on this ground, rev'd in part on other grounds, Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib.
Corp., 693 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1982).
158. Catalano, 446 U.S. at 650 (condemning agreement to not extend credit as per se illegal
price-fixing).
159. See Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 220-21.
160. See Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49-50 (1990) (per curiam); Blackburn v.
Sweeney, 53 F.3d 825,827 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Horizontal agreements to allocate markets among
competitors are per se violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act." (citing United States v. Topco
Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972))); Hammes v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 33 F.3d 774, 782 (7th
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But with a tying conspiracy, customers are in fact divided along the
following lines: each firm sells the tied product to customers that
have purchased the tying product from it, and not to customers who
have purchased the tying product from another member of the
conspiracy. After the tying relationships are entered into, the tying
sellers are not competing with each other for customers in the tied
product market.161
Finally, in some ways a tying conspiracy resembles a per se illegal
group boycott. In FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association
(SCTLA), the Court characterized an agreement as a per se illegal
group boycott when lawyers said, in effect, "we won't provide
services unless you agree to our terms"-in that case a wage
increase.162 Similarly, with tying conspiracies, the sellers are
collectively saying "we won't provide tying products unless you
agree to our terms"-that the buyer agree to purchase the tied
product as well. A tying conspiracy involves a comparable instance
of competitors agreeing to concentrate their economic power and
target it against consumers, the precise type of agreement that the
SCTLA Court held to be per se illegal.
These analogies suggest that treating tying conspiracies as
unreasonable as a matter of law does not create a new category of
per se illegality; it merely recognizes that this type of antitrust
conspiracy falls within existing categories of per se condemnation.
Indeed, concerted tying agreements arguably pose an even greater
anticompetitive threat because they combine two separate antitrust
violations-tie-ins and conspiracies-both of which individually
raise serious antitrust concerns.
In short, to the extent that tying conspiracies increase price and
reduce consumer choice, this type of conduct always or almost
Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Goodman, 850 F.2d 1473, 1477 (11th Cir. 1988)
("Undoubtedly, the government is correct that a customer allocation agreement is a per se
violation of the Sherman Act, and therefore pricing is not relevant."); Johnson v. Joseph
Schlitz Brewing Co., 33 F. Supp. 176, 181 (E.D. Tenn. 1940) ('That an agreement not to sell
to a particular person or class of persons is unlawful under the Sherman Act has long been
established.... To fix customers in agreement with others is inherently as bad as to fix prices.
Both stifle competition, and lead to monopolistic power.").
161. Customers desiring the tied product but not subject to a tying requirement would be
fair game.
162. See 493 U.S. 411, 436 (1990) (finding the per se rule applicable).
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always will negatively affect competition. That is sufficient to make
such agreements per se illegal.
Second, tying conspiracies should satisfy the criterion of judicial
experience. As an initial matter, having decided hundreds of tying
cases, federal courts understand tying arrangements generally.
Federal courts have had almost a century of experience examining
hundreds and hundreds of cases of traditional tying arrange-
ments.163 Judges understand the concept of tying and how, in some
cases, it can injure competition. Indeed, courts have had experience
with tying conspiracies, even if they have not adopted a uniform
nomenclature. In these cases, those courts that have examined
the anticompetitive effects have recognized that these horizontal
agreements do, in fact, unreasonably restrain competition.
16
Furthermore, a tying conspiracy is not so much a new type of
restraint, as it is a combination of well-known types of restraints
with which courts have significant experience: horizontal price-
fixing and customer allocation. Federal courts have accumulated
over a century of experience examining and condemning such
horizontal restraints. Appreciating the anticompetitive effects of
combining these two forms of anticompetitive conduct takes little
effort. In sum, courts know enough about tying arrangements-and
anticompetitive conspiracies in general-that they can easily
understand the anticompetitive effects of tying conspiracies.
Third, agreements among competitors to impose tying arrange-
ments would seem to lack any redeeming virtue. Although some
may argue for the efficiency of tie-ins in general, 16 5 such arguments
do not consider concerted tie-ins. Even if unilaterally imposed tying
arrangements may be defensible, there is no need for competitors to
agree with each other to implement tying policies. If tying arrange-
ments were truly efficient, competitors would not need to agree to
impose them.
Fourth, tying conspiracies bear the characteristics of those
restraints that make up the bulk of per se illegal conduct. Whereas
traditional tying arrangements are vertical, agreements among
163. See, e.g., Pick Mfg. Co. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 80 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1935), affd, 299
U.S. 3 (1936) (per curiam).
164. See, e.g., Rosebrough Monument Co. v. Mem'l Park Cemetery Ass'n, 666 F.2d 1130,
1140-41 (8th Cir. 1981).
165. See infra notes 195-206 and accompanying text.
2007] 2289
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
competitors to impose tying arrangements are clearly horizontal, by
definition. As such, they should be subject to more harsh treatment.
Moreover, tying conspiracies are arguably price-related. Although
tying conspiracies need not set the price for either the tying or tied
product, they have the effect of increasing price. 6 Consumers are
injured by-and the conspirators profit from-these price effects.
In addition to satisfying the stated criteria for per se illegality, a
per se rule against tying conspiracies has several additional
advantages. First, one virtue of the per se rule is certainty. As long
as a per se category is well-defined, firms can reasonably predict
whether their conduct will suffer swift condemnation. This clarity
is good for both potential defendants and plaintiffs. Firms should
know that entering such agreements will result in antitrust
liability. With a per se rule in place, firms will be less likely to
engage in tying conspiracies, making actual application of per se
condemnation less necessary. The certainty of a per se rule should
also encourage consumers to bring appropriate suits when they
discover that they have been victimized by a tying conspiracy.
Second, per se illegality helps compensate for the difficulty in
discovering tying conspiracies. Victims of antitrust conspiracies are
often unaware of the underlying violation. For example, price-fixing
is often effectively concealed from both antitrust prosecutors and
consumers, because the colluders take great strides to hide their
cartel activities, including having secret meetings and using code
names.167 Similarly, although unilaterally imposed tying require-
ments in the marketplace may be easy to spot, it takes considerably
more effort to uncover tying conspiracies.
Finally, tying conspiracies should necessarily be treated more
harshly than traditional tie-ins because concerted action is more
dangerous than unilateral conduct. Fundamental to the entire
structure of American antitrust law is the fact that concerted action
is to be "judged more sternly than unilateral activity."' 8 The
Supreme Court has long noted that an act that is harmless when
performed by one dealer "may become a public wrong when done by
166. See supra notes 77-88 and accompanying text.
167. See, e.g., JOHN HERLING, THE GREAT PRICE CONSPIRACY: THE STORY OF THE ANTITRUST
VIOLATIONS IN THE ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY 82-83 (1962).
168. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984).
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many acting in concert."'169 So it is with tying conspiracies: a
concerted tying arrangement is inherently more dangerous than a
unilaterally imposed tying arrangement because the conspiracy can
create market power where none existed previously. 17' All of the
potential anticompetitive risks of a tying arrangement are magni-
fied when competitors agree to impose tying requirements. Firms
that do not have sufficient market power to impose a tying arrange-
ment unilaterally may have such power when they act in concert.
Such collusion is particularly dangerous because, unlike illegal
monopolization, which takes time, a tying conspiracy represents
near-instantaneous acquisition and exercise of market power by
the conspirators in the aggregate. Furthermore, tie-ins imposed
pursuant to a conspiracy are less likely to be procompetitive or
efficient. Otherwise, the firms would have implemented the tying
requirements without the agreement. Most importantly, competi-
tors' joint implementation of tying requirements reduces and can
even eliminate consumers' ability to evade the tie-in by purchasing
the tying product from another seller. This increases both the
exclusionary and anticonsumer effects of tie-ins. Antitrust jurispru-
dence should reflect this asymmetry in anticompetitive risks by
evaluating tying conspiracies more harshly than tie-ins imposed by
a single seller.
All of these arguments should overcome the courts' stated
reluctance to expand per se categories. Although there may be a
concern that a per se rule could condemn beneficial agreements,
what are the beneficial effects of competitors agreeing to impose
tying arrangements that would be lost under a per se rule against
tying conspiracies? When tie-ins are net beneficial, individual firms
acting independently can still employ them.
Proposing a stricter rule for concerted tying arrangements might
seem unnecessary because tying arrangements are already subject
to per se condemnation.' 7 ' But the so-called per se rule applied to
169. E. States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 614 (1914)
(quoting Grenada Lumber Co. v. Mississippi, 217 U.S. 433, 440 (1910)).
170. See Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 769 ("In any conspiracy, two or more entities that
previously pursued their own interests separately are combining to act as one for their
common benefit. This not only reduces the diverse directions in which economic power is
aimed but suddenly increases the economic power moving in one particular direction.").
171. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15-16 (1984), abrogated
in part on other grounds by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1284
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traditional tying arrangements is not a per se rule at all.1"2 It
requires proof of defendant's market power over the tying product,
allows the defendant to argue that its tie-in was justified, and-in
some circuits-requires the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the tying arrangement had anticompetitive
effects. 173 I propose a true per se rule for tying conspiracies, such
that after the plaintiff has proven an agreement among competitors
to impose tie-ins, the plaintiff need not prove market power or
effects to establish liability. 174 Finally, the defendant should not be
able to escape liability by arguing that it had a legitimate business
justification for the tie-in, as the following section explains in
greater detail.
C. Naked Tying Conspiracies Versus Ancillary Restraints
A word of caution is necessary about what constitutes a tying
conspiracy, and, thus, when the per se rule is properly invoked. The
tying conspiracies analyzed in Part II were naked conspiracies,
agreements among independent competitors to impose onerous
conditions on their customers. The issue becomes more complicated
when the agreement to impose tying requirements occurs within
the context of a legitimate joint venture comprised of otherwise
competing firms. In determining whether to apply the per se rule,
antitrust law distinguishes between naked and ancillary agree-
ments.175 Whereas naked restraints are condemned as per se illegal,
(2006).
172. See id. at 34 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) ('CThe Court has never been
willing to say of tying arrangements, as it has of price fixing, division of markets, and other
agreements subject to per se analysis, that they are always illegal, without proof of market
power or anticompetitive effect.").
173. Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale Coll., 237 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating five
elements, including "anticompetitive effects in the tied market," required for a tying claim
(quoting Gonzalez v. St. Margaret's House Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 880 F.2d 1514, 1516-17 (2d
Cir. 1989))); see also Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 34 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment) ('CThe 'per se' doctrine in tying cases has thus always required an elaborate inquiry
into the economic effects of the tying arrangement.").
174. Of course, the plaintiff would still have to prove causal antitrust injury and calculate
damages. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 909 n. 15 (6th Cir. 2003) ("Our
conclusion that the Agreement was a per se illegal restraint of trade does not obviate the need
to decide whether the plaintiffs adequately alleged antitrust injury.").
175. See Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 7-9 (2006).
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a restraint that is ancillary to an overall procompetitive arrange-
ment can evade both per se condemnation and, perhaps, antitrust
liability altogether." ' Even with horizontal price-fixing-the
quintessential per se illegal violation-courts have distinguished
between naked agreements and those restraints ancillary to
legitimate procompetitive collaborations.
177
Some ancillary restraints may appear to be tying conspiracies,
but are not. For example, local associations of realtors generally
maintain policies that some might characterize as a form of
concerted tying. Real estate agents often combine through realtor
associations to create a multiple listing service (MLS), in which all
of the available properties in a particular geographic area are listed
in a centralized registry. Realtor associations commonly require
membership in the National Association of Realtors or similar local
boards as a prerequisite to allowing a real estate agent access to a
multiple listing service. Some real estate agents have brought
antitrust suits challenging the membership requirements as illegal
tying arrangements, with access to the MLS as the tying product;
and membership in the realtor association as the tied product:
realtors are required to purchase membership (which some do not
want) in order to acquire MLS access (which they do want).
Although it might be tempting to characterize this as a tying
conspiracy-because it is imposed by the otherwise competing
members of a realtor association-such arrangements should not be
condemned under the per se rule proposed in this Article, because
the membership requirement is not a naked tying conspiracy. Such
realtor associations are efficient joint ventures that "offer[] services
to [their] members including training, technology services, computer
classes, comparative data, legislative monitoring, and publica-
tions.' 78 Most importantly, this combination of realtors creates and
maintains an important product, the MLS, that otherwise would not
exist.'7 9 Further, federal courts have generally upheld realtor
176. See id.
177. See id. at 1281; Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 20 (1979)
('The blanket license ... is not a 'naked restraint] of trade with no purpose except stifling of
competition' ...." (quoting White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963))
(alteration in original)).
178. Buyer's Corner Realty, Inc. v. N. Ky. Ass'n of Realtors, 410 F. Supp. 2d 574, 576 (E.D.
Ky. 2006).
179. See Reifert v. S. Cent. Wis. MLS Corp., 450 F.3d 312, 317 (7th Cir. 2006) ("The MLS
2007] 2293
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
association rules that condition access to an MLS on membership in
a particular realtors association as not indicative of an unlawful
tying arrangement.18 ° In most cases, there is no ill effect on
competition in the alleged tied market-membership in a realtor
association-because there are no competing associations. 181 In
applying the Rule of Reason in these cases, courts have employed
the proper mode of analysis: because the alleged tie-in occurs in the
context of a legitimate joint venture, courts must balance the
procompetitive and anticompetitive potential of the arrangements.
In sum, concerted tying that is ancillary to a legitimate joint
venture is fundamentally different from a naked tying conspiracy in
which competing sellers agree to impose onerous terms on their
customers solely to extract more money or to erect barriers to entry.
Certainly, the concerted tying arrangements in the IBM and
cemetery cases were naked. They were not pursued pursuant to a
larger procompetitive scheme designed to increase consumer
welfare. We should not be so eager to characterize an agreement as
a tying conspiracy that we ignore the context in which the agree-
ment happens. Such ancillary restraints should not be condemned
under a per se rule against tying conspiracies.
This Article focuses only on naked tying conspiracies: agreements
between competitors to impose tying requirements on their
respective customers. These are the types of conspiracies docu-
mented in the IBM and cemetery tying cases. In some cases, it may
be too difficult for a court to define the precise boundary between
naked tying conspiracies and agreements that might appear to some
allows individuals with access to search and filter properties based upon detailed criteria
including compensation offered to buyers' agents, detailed property information, neighborhood
information, prior sales history, offers made on the property, days on the market, and the sale
price of comparable homes. The features and information available through [the MILS] are not
available through any other service.").
180. See, e.g., id. at 318; Wells Real Estate, Inc. v. Greater Lowell Bd. of Realtors, 850 F.2d
803, 815 (1st Cir. 1988); Buyer's Corner Realty, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 574; O'Riordan v. Long
Island Bd. of Realtors, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 111, 116-17 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
181. See Buyer's Corner Realty, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 583 ("[P]laintiffs have shown no
foreclosure in the market for the tied product, and their tying claim should thus be
dismissed.").
When the defendants' membership requirement forces real estate agents desiring access
to MLS to abandon another competing realtor association, that requirement can create




to be tying conspiracies but that were truly ancillary to legitimate
joint ventures. In such instances, a Rule of Reason--either full or
abbreviated, depending on the facts-is appropriate. But defendants
should not be permitted to create ambiguity out of whole cloth:
when competitors conspire outside of a legitimate joint venture to
impose a tying requirement on their customers, courts should
condemn the agreement as per se illegal.
D. Traditional Tying Defenses and the Absence of Legitimate
Business Justifications for Tying Conspiracies
This Article advocates true per se illegality for tying conspiracies.
If the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of a tying conspiracy,
then there should be no business justification defense for the
agreement. This section reviews those business reasons that have
been offered by tying defendants and antitrust commentators. Some
have been successful in courts; others have not. However, none of
them justify competitors agreeing to impose tying requirements on
their customers.
Per se illegality is supposed to mean that the defendant cannot
justify its conduct by asserting that it had a legitimate business
reason unrelated to the suppression of competition. In nontying
cases, the defendant is not generally afforded the opportunity to
justify or defend its conduct if it falls in a per se category. Once the
court determines that the challenged agreement is properly labeled
as per se illegal, the antitrust liability inquiry is over."'2
Although courts refer to tie-ins as per se illegal, judges also
sometimes permit tying defendants to assert the defense that the
tying arrangement is justified because the tying seller had a
legitimate business reason for imposing the tie-in unrelated to the
suppression of competition." 3 Courts have entertained several
defenses in traditional tying cases. First, some tying defendants
182. See Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1058 (8th Cir. 2000);
Addamax Corp. v. Open Software Found., Inc., 152 F.3d 48, 51 (1st Cir. 1998) ("Where a
plaintiff proves conduct that falls within a per se category, nothing more is needed for
liability; the defendants' power, illicit purpose and anticompetitive effect are all said to be
irrelevant." (citing United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940))).
183. See, e.g., Rosebrough Monument Co. v. Mem'l Park Cemetery Ass'n, 666 F.2d 1130,
1145 (8th Cir. 1981).
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have argued that the tying requirement is necessary to ensure the
proper operation of the tying product,14 and thus protect the tying
sellers' goodwill. Finding this explanation persuasive, some jurists
have argued that tying arrangements "may protect the reputation
of the tying product if failure to use the tied product in conjunction
with it may cause it to misfunction."'88 Although the Supreme
Court has "uniformly rejected similar 'goodwill' defenses for tying
arrangements, finding that the use of contractual quality specifica-
tions are generally sufficient to protect quality without the use of a
tying arrangement,"'1 6 some lower courts have been more receptive
to this defense.' 87 Second, the Supreme Court has "indicate[d] that
tying may be permissible when necessary to enable a new business
to break into the market."' 8 This is a form of a goodwill defense, but
is limited to infant industries. Third, some tying sellers try to justify
their tie-ins as responding to consumer demand. 9 Finally, some
believe that tie-ins may increase efficiency because "if the tied and
tying products are functionally related, they may reduce costs
through economies of joint production and distribution."'9
None of these traditionally attempted defenses can justify a
tying conspiracy. If the tying arrangement served an important
goal, then each seller could impose the tie-in individually. For
example, if a firm felt that other versions of the tied product were
184. See, e.g., United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 555-60 (E.D. Pa.
1960), affd, Jerrold Elecs. Corp. v. United States, 365 U.S. 567 (1961) (mem.) (per curiam);
Pick Mfg. Co. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 80 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1935), affd, 299 U.S. 3 (1936) (per
curiam).
185. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 41 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (quoting Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp. (Fortner 1), 394
U.S. 495, 514 n.19 (1969) (White, J., dissenting)), abrogated in part on other grounds by Ill.
Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1284 (2006).
186. Id. at 26 n.42 (majority opinion) (citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S.
293, 305-06 (1949); Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1947), abrogated in
part on other grounds by Ill. Tool Works, 126 S. Ct. at 1284; IBM Corp. v. United States, 298
U.S. 131, 138-40 (1936); Comment, Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws: The
"Integrity of the Product" Defense, 62 MICH. L. REV. 1413 (1964)).
187. See, e.g., Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 833 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1987).
188. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 24 n.39 (discussing Jerrold, 365 U.S. at 555-58).
189. Id. at 12 ("Buyers often find package sales attractive; a seller's decision to offer such
packages can merely be an attempt to compete effectively--conduct that is entirely consistent
with the Sherman Act.").
190. Id. at 41 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 514
n.9 (White J., dissenting)).
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not properly interoperable with the tying product and that the tying
seller would be blamed for any malfunctions, it would impose the
tying clause whether or not its competitors had a similar require-
ment.' 91 Similarly, if consumers truly demanded tie-ins-a hypothe-
sis that seems weak on its face-firms would pursue this strategy
without a conspiracy among competitors. Finally, with respect to the
efficiency defense, if a tie-in created economies of scale or scope in
a particular industry, then the firms would not need to agree to
impose tying requirements. They would do it unilaterally and
independently because it was efficient. 9 2 If conduct is unilaterally
efficient, firms do not need to do it pursuant to a conspiracy. In
short, because concerted action is fundamentally different from
unilateral conduct, the defenses that are allowed in cases of
unilateral tying should not be permitted in tying conspiracies.
In addition to those tying defenses considered by courts, the
Chicago School has attempted to justify tie-ins as mechanisms of
efficient price discrimination.'93 Not only does the metering
explanation fail to excuse concerted tying arrangements, it shows
why tying conspiracies should be treated as per se illegal horizontal
price-fixing. The metering story only makes sense as a defense of
tying when the choice is between price discrimination and monop-
oly pricing.9 When there is only one seller of the tying product,
metering could possibly expand output more than monopoly pricing.
But in the case of concerted tying, the alternative is not monopoly
pricing; there are multiple sellers of the tying product--otherwise
there could not be a horizontal agreement. In the absence of the
tying conspiracy, there likely would not be monopoly pricing for the
tying product, but rather competitive pricing. If the competing
sellers are unable to jointly impose a tying arrangement, that
191. This same argument applies to the infant industry defense of tying arrangements.
However, new markets also seem unlikely to be plagued by tying conspiracies to the extent
that the infant industries scenario essentially assumes one new start-up testing a new
product.
192. Indeed, if tying were efficient, rational competitors would prefer to be the only firm
tying, as no firm wants to reduce its rivals' costs.
193. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
194. Also, the metering explanation only applies with requirements ties in which the tie-in
is a metering device, and not so much with one-to-one bundling. Yet some of the tying
conspiracies found in case law are one-to-one bundling.
2007] 2297
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
particular marketplace is less likely to have tie-ins.195 Although each
seller possibly would attempt to impose the tying requirement-just
as sellers may attempt to charge a higher than competitive price
even absent a cartel agreement in the hopes that its competitors will
follow suit--competition will just as likely result when consumers
balk at the tie-in and one seller breaks rank to sell a greater
quantity of the (formerly) tying product by removing the tying
requirement. In short, absent the tying conspiracy, the tying sellers
would have to compete against each other and would be more likely
to bid the price of the tying product down to the efficient, competi-
tive price. The premise of the Chicago School thesis-society must
choose between price discrimination and monopoly pricing--does
not hold in markets with tying conspiracies and thus should provide
no defense to tying in these cases.
Courts have considered legitimate business justification defenses
in some tying conspiracy cases.' 96 Although courts have ultimately
rejected the justifications because the asserted goal was achievable
through a less restrictive alternative, the courts employed the legal
tests used for traditional unilaterally imposed tie-ins. Courts
naively recite that "[t]ying arrangements are valid if they can be
shown to protect a legitimate antitrust interest.'1 97 But courts
developed this rule for unilateral tying arrangements, not horizontal
tying conspiracies. If defendants were to offer a legitimate business
rationale, it would have to justify their agreement to employ tying
arrangements. Even if it makes sense for an individual firm to
insert a tying clause in its contracts, that in no way justifies an
agreement among competitors to simultaneously impose tying
requirements.
In short, the main reason that these rationales for tying require-
ments fail to provide a defense to tying conspiracies is that they
focus on the wrong act. Under a per se rule against tying conspira-
cies, the tying arrangement is not being condemned; the agreement
is. Even if the individual tie-ins were somehow defensible, the
conspiracy itself would not be. By analogy, although charging a
particular price might be reasonable, agreeing with competitors to
195. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
196. See, e.g., Rosebrough Monument Co. v. Memre Park Cemetery Ass'n, 666 F.2d 1130,
1139 n.5 (8th Cir. 1981).
197. Id. at 1145.
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charge that price is not. 198 Just as a firm can unilaterally raise its
price without creating antitrust liability but cannot raise its price
pursuant to an agreement with competitors, a firm that may be
justified in imposing a tying requirement on its own cannot do so in
agreement with its competitors. Thus, defendants found to have
entered into a tying conspiracy should not be allowed to argue that
the tying arrangement is reasonable.
E. Aggregate Market Effects and the Need To Limit Safe Harbors
in Tying Law
The current legal test for per se illegal tie-ins includes a safe
harbor that applies when the defendant possesses a 30% (or less)
market share over the tying product. The Jefferson Parish Court
held that if the tying seller has less than 30% share in the market
for tying product, then the tying arrangement is not per se illegal.' 99
Instead, the tie-in is evaluated under the Rule of Reason. °° The
court assumes that if the seller of the tying product had only 30% or
less of the market for the tying product then it did not have the
economic power to impose a tying arrangement because consumers
wishing to purchase the tying product without the tied product
could simply purchase the tying product from someone else.20'
The Jefferson Parish safe harbor for tying arrangements has not
functioned as the Court announced. The safe harbor is supposed to
remove a particular tying arrangement from the per se category so
that it receives a full analysis under the Rule of Reason. However,
the Rule of Reason applied to tying arrangements is so deferential
as to be meaningless in most cases. Tying arrangements are simply
not condemned under the Rule of Reason.0 2 The 30% safe harbor
198. The Supreme Court has made clear that, in the context of horizontal price-fixing
agreements, defendants may not argue that the fixed price was reasonable. See, e.g., United
States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 396-99 (1927).
199. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 26-27 (1984), abrogated by Ill.
Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1284 (2006).
200. If the defendant does not have high market share, then the Rule of Reason applies.
See id. at 17-18.
201. Id. at 34 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Without 'control or dominance
over the tying product,' the seller could not use the tying product as 'an effectual weapon to
pressure buyers into taking the tied item,' so that any restraint of trade would be
'insignificant."' (quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958))).
202. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 210 (5th ed.
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operates as effective absolution from antitrust liability in tying
cases. °3 Thus, what is supposed to be a mere escape from the per se
rule operates as an effective immunity from antitrust liability for
these tying arrangements altogether.
There are two possible approaches to the problem posed by the
Jefferson Parish safe harbor in tying conspiracy cases: eliminate the
safe harbor altogether or modify its application when a tying
arrangement is the product of a horizontal agreement. On the one
hand, it could be argued that safe harbors have no place in the law
of horizontal tying conspiracies. The premise of the safe harbor is
that if the defendant has a low market share in the tying product
market, consumers can easily evade the tying requirement by
purchasing the tying product from another source that does not
impose a tie-in. But this assumes an absence of collusion among
sellers. If the major competitors in a market agree to impose a tying
arrangement, then this could have the same coercive effect of a
tying arrangement imposed by a monopolist.2 °4 Consumers would
not be able to avoid the tying arrangement.2 °5 Nevertheless, despite
the fact that such a concerted tying arrangement would have similar
effects to a traditional tying arrangement, each conspirator
imposing the tying arrangement would technically fall within the
2002) ("Since the Supreme Court's decision in Jefferson Parish, plaintiffs' victories on Rule
of Reason tying claims have been rare.").
203. See Brokerage Concepts, Inc. v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 140 F.3d 494, 517 (3d Cir. 1998)
("In fact, since Jefferson Parish no court has inferred substantial market power from a market
share below 30 percent.").
204. For example, if there were ten firms of equal size in a market and each agreed that
they would impose a tying arrangement, each firm would have a mere ten percent market
share in the tying product market, and each could point to their market share as a defense.
However, consumers would feel oppressed by this concerted tying arrangement the same as
they would by a traditional tying arrangement imposed by a monopolist.
205. Consumers would be forced to buy a tied product even if they do not want the tied
product. Also, consumers would be effectively precluded from buying the tied product from
another source. Under a requirements tying contract, the consumers would be contractually
forbidden from buying the tied product from another seller. But even without such an explicit
prohibition, the effect is the same. For example, if a specialty store makes only the tied
product and the consumer would rather purchase the tied product from that source, the
consumer is less likely to be able to do so because she will be forced to buy the tied product
from whomever she purchases the tying product. This also shows a tying conspiracy's
anticompetitive effects on competitors in the tied product market. Even if the specialist makes
a better version of the tied product at a lower price, consumers cannot buy the product if tying
requirements bind them, and a tying conspiracy prevents consumers from avoiding tie-ins.
[Vol. 48:22472300
TYING CONSPIRACIES
Jefferson Parish safe harbor as long as its individual market share
was below 30%.
The above argument implicitly assumed that the combined
market shares of the tying sellers was high. What if the opposite
were true? If the combined market shares of the conspirators is low,
competition seemingly is not injured because consumers can simply
shop elsewhere. But this is true for all per se violations. If two
relatively small sellers in a market agreed to fix prices, most
consumers could avert anticompetitive injury by purchasing the
product from a nonconspirator who charged a lower price. Despite
this effect, horizontal price-fixing agreements are per se illegal and
defendants are not allowed to point to their low market shares as a
defense. This rule is sound for a couple of reasons.
First, some consumers may fail to appreciate price differentials
and purchase from the conspirators. Similarly, some may fail to
appreciate the implications of the tying clause and later regret being
bound.2"6 Second, restraints in the per se category are dangerous
and without redeeming virtues. Antitrust law does not permit
competitors to enter these types of agreements because they are
inherently anticompetitive. After all, given the lack of justification,
competitors would have little reason to enter such arrangements
unless they believed there would be an anticompetitive effect. Third,
allowing the defendants to shift attention away from their agree-
ment to their respective market shares would unnecessarily
complicate and lengthen the litigation as the parties debated
market definition and measurement. Defendants should not be able
to delay the plaintiffs' recovery and to waste judicial resources
when there is little reason to suspect that such an inquiry would
increase the accuracy of litigation results.2 7 In short, this is the type
of agreement that rivals should not be making. Antitrust law
should have a bright-line rule that clearly forbids competitors from
entering into such agreements.
206. This was the case in the Illinois Tool Works case, in which, according to the tying
seller's own surveys, its customers were displeased to find themselves locked into a tying
arrangement in which the tying seller charged an excessive price for the tied product. Indep.
Ink, Inc. v. Trident, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1167 n.12 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
207. Even if the market shares of the two horizontal competitors do not add up to a
combined market share of greater than 30%, the agreement between the competitors to
simultaneously impose a tying arrangement should still constitute per se illegal conduct.
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Furthermore, it bears noting that the Jefferson Parish Court
announced the safe harbor for tie-ins in the context of unilaterally
imposed tying arrangements. °8 The Supreme Court has never
considered the particular harms associated with concerted tying
arrangements imposed by competitors where the result should be
different. To the extent that the Jefferson Parish Court presumed an
otherwise competitive market in the tying product, the presence of
a conspiracy should eliminate the safe harbor.
On the other hand, if courts are reticent to ignore the 30% market
share safe harbor altogether, then at a minimum courts should
apply the safe harbor differently in the context of tying conspiracies.
When evaluating this defense, some courts do not aggregate the
market shares of the alleged tying conspirators, nor do judges
consider the concerted nature of the tying arrangement." 9 Indeed,
courts have dismissed tying conspiracy cases while chastising the
plaintiff for "refer[ring] only to the market share of [defendants]
collectively, failing to make even the barest allegation that any
[defendant] acting alone possesses a substantial market share."'2 10
This makes little sense. When the plaintiff alleges a tying conspir-
acy, and not merely a simple tie-in, the collective market shares of
the conspirators informs the court about their ability to distort the
competitive market. Individual market shares add little important
information if the aggregate market share is known. The credit card
antitrust litigation demonstrates the importance of combining the
market shares of tying sellers who have conspired to impose tying
208. Although the tying arrangement in that case can be conceived as concerted action
between the hospital and the anesthesiology firm, the Court did not perceive it that way. The
Court in Jefferson Parish treated the tying arrangement as imposed by the hospital alone and
concluded that because the hospital had only 30% market share, the tie-in could not be per
se illegal. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984), abrogated in part
on other grounds by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1284 (2006).
209. See Rosebrough Monument Co. v. Mem'l Park Cemetery Ass'n, 666 F.2d 1130, 1142-43
(8th Cir. 1981).
210. Silkworth v. Cedar Hill Cemetery, No. 694, 1993 WL 122104, at *3 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
Feb. 11, 1993) (per curiam) ('To withstand dismissal for failure to state a claim on the
individual tying counts, appellant must allege that 'each defendant cemetery's share of the
relevant market was sufficient to endow that defendant with enough market power to
establish per se illegality.' As a result of appellant's failure to even allege that any appellee
possessed sufficient market share individually, his individual tying claims must fail." (citation




requirements. The district court declined to find that MasterCard
was ineligible for safe harbor protection because its market
share-26-28% of the market-was below 30%.211 But the fact that
Visa imposed an identical tying requirement dramatically increased
the anticompetitive effects of MasterCard's tying arrangement.
Courts should not look at the second firm's market share over the
tying product in isolation. Context is critical. Even more clearly in
the IBM tying case, IBM and Remington Rand were the only
competitors in the relevant markets for tabulating machines and
tabulating cards.21 Although Remington Rand's market share was
probably well below 30% of the market,214 the existence of the
agreement between it and IBM was sufficient to condemn both firms
under the per se rule regardless of its market share over the tying
product. However, even without proof of an explicit agreement
between the two firms, Remington Rand should not have been able
to take advantage of the Jefferson Parish safe harbor so long as IBM
was imposing an identical tying requirement. Remington Rand's
customers would have been unable to evade the tying requirement.
This gave the company sufficient market power to force the tie-in
onto unwilling customers. If the 30% market share safe harbor is
maintained for such tie-ins, the market share of each conspirator
should be aggregated." 5 If the combined market shares of the
211. In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 2003 WL 1712568, at *4 (E.D.N.Y.
Apr. 1, 2003) ("MasterCard's share of the credit and charge card services market, however,
has fluctuated from between 26 to 28 percent over the same period, and its share of the credit
card market alone has varied from between 33 to 36 percent. At this stage in the proceedings,
I cannot conclude as a matter of law that MasterCard has 'sufficient economic power' to
warrant application of the per se rule." (quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,
5-7 (1958))).
212. IBM Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
213. See United States v. IBM Corp., 13 F. Supp. 11, 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1935) ("[IBM] and
Remington are the only concerns now engaged in manufacturing and selling tabulating cards
in the regular course of business in the United States ....").
214. The case does not provide Remington Rand's market share in the market for the tying
product-tabulating machines-but notes that its share in the tied product
market-tabulating cards--was 19%, compared to IBM's 81%. We may reasonably assume
that their relative market shares in machines were roughly equivalent. Id. at 15.
215. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., X ANTITRUST LAW 1734 (1996) ("Universal tying
within a highly concentrated market cannot be so innocently explained and may therefore
reflect tacitly coordinated 'shared market power' eliminating consumer choice, thus creating
a potential for the detriments that might flow from tying. Of course, we should clearly
cumulate the market shares of sellers who have conspired with each other to impose tying on
their customers.").
2007] 2303
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
conspirators exceed 30%, then no firm should be protected by the
safe harbor, because the conspirators as a group "have 'sufficient
economic power with respect to the tying product to appreciably
restrain free competition in the market for the tied product.' 216
In sum, the Jefferson Parish safe harbor of 30% market share
should not apply to concerted tying arrangements. Either all
firms participating in a tying conspiracy should be deemed to
have violated section 1 of the Sherman Act, or, at a minimum,
their individual market shares should be aggregated to determine
whether the safe harbor applies.
V. AN ANTITRUST CAUSE OF ACTION FOR TYING CONSPIRACIES
Tying conspiracies and tying arrangements are separate causes
of action, each with each its own elements. This Part reviews what
a plaintiff should have to prove in order to establish that the
defendants have engaged in a per se illegal tying conspiracy. It will
also explain why some of the per se elements applied in traditional
tying cases are unnecessary to prove that a tying conspiracy violates
section 1 of the Sherman Act. Because the two tying causes of action
are not mutually exclusive, even without an agreement, a unilater-
ally imposed tying arrangement can still violate the antitrust laws
under existing case law.217
A. Elements for Per Se Illegal Tying Conspiracies
The basic elements for a section 1 violation are (1) an agreement
or concerted action (2) that represents an unreasonable restraint of
trade and (3) has an effect on interstate commerce." ' The third
element is easily satisfied and rarely an issue in section 1 litigation,
so it will not be addressed here. The meat of any section 1 case lies
in the first two elements.
216. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 34 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 6), abrogated in part on
other grounds by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1284 (2006).
217. This Part does not address the elements of a traditional tying claim.




The first element in a section 1 violation is proof of an agreement
or concerted action."' The plaintiff would have to prove an agree-
ment in order to show a tying conspiracy. But, as the following
subsection explains, the nature of the agreement is different with a
tying conspiracy as opposed to a traditional tying arrangement.
a. Agreement Among Competitors
In order for a tying conspiracy to qualify for per se condemnation,
there must be an agreement among competitors to condition the sale
of a tying product on the purchase of a specified tied product. In
some cases, a tying seller may require its customers to purchase the
tied product from a designated supplier, who may or may not
provide a kickback to the tying seller.22° Although there is often an
agreement between the tying seller and the designated supplier of
the tied product, their relationship is not horizontal and does not
constitute a tying conspiracy, as that phrase is being used here. The
horizontal aspect of tying conspiracies is what results in the instant
concentration of economic wealth in a manner that harms consum-
ers.
Proving an agreement among competitors to impose tying
requirements may be difficult. As with all conspiracies, the best
evidence would be direct proof, such as a written agreement, a video
or audio tape, or the testimony of eyewitnesses. Establishing a case
through conscious parallelism could prove difficult because circum-
stantial evidence of agreement may be ambiguous, as we often see
multiple firms unilaterally impose similar tying arrangements. For
example, sometimes the tied product is a warranty; yet it would not
be surprising if every firm in a particular market had such a tie-in.
This is the sort of policy that we would expect firms to impose
unilaterally so we should not readily infer agreement from the fact
that all firms have the same policy in this area. This should not
219. Id.
220. See, e.g., Ky. Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 378-80
(5th Cir. 1977).
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prove to be a problem, as courts will not hesitate to dismiss tying
conspiracy cases based on mere "similarity of business practices. 221
Finally, there should be no need to prove any explicit agreement
on price among the tying conspirators. In the cemetery cases,
district courts had found no conspiracy because the competing firms
did not fix prices for the tied product foundation preparation
work.222 This is wrong. Although tying conspiracies are particularly
deleterious when used to stabilize a price-fixing cartel,2 concerted
tying arrangements injure competition even without a corollary
agreement on price. They allow each firm to reduce consumer
choice, to create barriers to entry, and to impose a burdensome term
on its customers, which they could not do in a free market.
b. Agreement with Buyer Unnecessary
One of the oddities with tying law is that courts condemn
traditional tie-ins under section 1 of the Sherman Act. However, a
traditional tying arrangement is not the result of concerted action.
An illegal tie-in occurs when a single firm with market power
imposes the tying requirement on its customers. Unlike other
section 1 violations, there are not multiple wrongdoers. Although
the vast majority of courts simply ignore section l's agreement
requirement in tying cases, those judges that have addressed the
issue have asserted that the illegal agreement is the contract
between the seller and the buyer.224 This makes little analytic sense
given that the buyer is the victim and that section 1 is concerned
about the concentration of economic power resulting from the illegal
agreement. 25 Further, this means that there is no antitrust
violation unless the consumer actually accepts the tying require-
ment.226
221. E.g., Silkworth v. Cedar Hill Cemetery, Inc., No. 694, 1993 WL 122104, at *4 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. Feb. 11, 1993) (per curiam) ("Appellant's complaint is devoid of factual allegations
pointing tu an actual agreement among appellees. Instead, appellant infers such an
agreement from the similarity of business practices engaged in by all appellees and their
common membership in a statewide trade association.").
222. See Rosebrough Monument Co. v. Mem'l Park Cemetery Ass'n, 505 F. Supp. 525, 530-
31 (E.D. Mo. 1980), affd in part, rev'd in part, 666 F.2d 1130 (8th Cir. 1981).
223. See supra notes 82-91 and accompanying text.
224. See, e.g., Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang Labs. Corp., 117 F.3d 1137, 1145 (10th Cir. 1997).
225. Leslie, supra note 1, at 1817-19 & n.191.
226. Warner Mgmt. Consultants, Inc. v. Data Gen. Corp., 545 F. Supp. 956, 964 n.8 (N.D.
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Tying conspiracies eliminate the need for the twisted logic of
pretending that the victim is part of the conspiracy. There is no
need to have the consumer agree in order to establish a section 1
violation. The agreement between the competitors alone triggers
liability, just as in the case of horizontal price-fixing. This means
that the consumer need not actually submit in order for there to be
an antitrust violation. The agreement among competitors is the
violation. The consumers' response will determine damages but is
not necessary for liability.
2. Two Products
Under the traditional tying test, the plaintiff must prove that the
tying and tied products are two separate products.227 Much time is
invested into discussing whether two products are truly separate.228
This element is designed to determine whether a single seller is
leveraging (legitimate) market power in one product market in order
to (illegitimately) restrain competition in a separate product
market. But the misdeed in tying conspiracies is the collusion
among competitors; the creation of market power by collusion-and
not merely the leveraging across markets-is what represents the
core of the antitrust violation here. If a tying plaintiff can prove
that competitors agreed to link two products, that is sufficient to
show a tying conspiracy. The two-product element applied in
unilateral tying cases is a red herring in concerted tying litigation.
Conspirators may attempt to focus judicial and jury attention on
whether there are truly two separate products under the legal test
developed for unilaterally imposed tying arrangements and away
from the fact that competitors conspired to link two product markets
to the detriment of consumers. The inquiry makes sense for
unilateral tie-ins because if two separate product markets are not
present, then the seller is not leveraging their legitimate market
Ill. 1982) ("In the usual case where a distributor refuses to purchase goods under a tying
arrangement, there will be no cause of action on the merits. The unsuccessful attempt to
impose a tie will usually be merely unilateral action and there will be no 'contract,
combination or conspiracy' within the meaning of the Sherman Act, and no 'contract' within
the meaning of the Clayton Act.").
227. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984), abrogated in part
on other grounds by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1284 (2006).
228. See, e.g., id. at 18-25 (discussing the two products requirement).
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power in one market into a second market. Without the two-product
element, the possession and exercise of legitimate market power
could be sanctioned. However, with tying conspiracies, there is no
risk of condemning legitimate market power because the power over
the tying product is created by an illegitimate agreement among
competitors. Furthermore, courts do not generally require market
definition for per se violations, such as per se illegal price fixing.229
So should it be with tying conspiracies, which should be analyzed
under a true per se rule.
B. Elements the Plaintiff in a Tying Conspiracy Case Need Not
Prove
True per se treatment of concerted tying arrangements would
fundamentally change the antitrust analysis of these tie-ins by
eliminating the need for the plaintiff to prove many of the elements
required in the current test designed to condemn unilaterally
imposed tying arrangements. Namely, courts should not require the
plaintiff to establish the defendants' market power or that coercion
was applied by the tying sellers. The agreement among competitors
is the antitrust violation. Further, those circuits that require the
plaintiff to show anticompetitive effect would not need to do so if
they applied a true per se rule against tying conspiracies, as they
should.
1. Market Power
If tying conspiracies are treated as per se illegal, then there
should be no need to show the market power of the conspirators. As
with per se illegal price-fixing agreements, the conspirators would
likely not have conspired unless they believed that they had a
reasonable chance of injuring competition. The conspirators' own
prediction should suffice. The process of engaging in lengthy market
definition analysis is unnecessary when competitors conspire to
disrupt the market, however it is defined.
229. See, e.g., TV Signal Co. of Aberdeen v. AT&T, 617 F.2d 1302, 1309 n.8 (8th Cir. 1980)




This would represent an appropriate shift from the way some
courts have approached tying conspiracies. Though ultimately
reaching the correct result, appellate courts have required plaintiffs
to prove that defendants who have conspired to impose horizontal
tying arrangements possessed sufficient economic power over the
tying product.23 Although often reversed, district courts have
dismissed allegations of concerted tying arrangements for failure to
state a claim when the complaint did not establish the defendants'
market power over the tying product.23' Indeed, in some cases,
district courts have found that defendants' collective market share
of over half the market was insufficient to establish a claim.232 Most
recently, although the main thrust of Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v.
Independent Ink, Inc. was to eliminate the presumption that a
seller's patent over the tying product confers market power, the
Court suggested in dicta that all tying plaintiffs-including those
alleging a tying conspiracy-must prove that the defendant(s)
possessed market power over the tying product.233
Regardless of how wise such a rule is in traditional unilateral
tying cases, the market power element is ill-suited for the unique
harms imposed by concerted tie-ins. There should be no need to
prove market power when tying arrangements are implemented
pursuant to a conspiracy among competitors. This type of agreement
is so dangerous that it should be condemned categorically. There
should be no need for the plaintiff to prove market power; it is an
unnecessary inquiry. Alternatively, if courts do insist on examining
230. Monument Builders of Greater Kan. City, Inc. v. Am. Cemetery Ass'n., 891 F.2d 1473,
1482-83 (10th Cir. 1989); Baxley-Delamar Monuments, Inc. v. Am. Cemetery Ass'n, 843 F.2d
1154, 1156-57 (8th Cir. 1988); Rosebrough Monument Co. v. Mem'l Park Cemetery Ass'n, 666
F.2d 1130, 1142-43 (8th Cir. 1981); Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1215-16
(9th Cir. 1977).
231. See, e.g., Baxley-Delamar, 843 F.2d at 1155; see also Silkworthv. Cedar Hill Cemetery,
No. 694, 1993 WL 122104, at *1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Feb. 11, 1993) (per curiam) ("The [trial]
court noted that appellant had failed to describe any specific relevant market or to show
appellees' market power in any such market.").
232. See, e.g., Baxley-Delarnar, 843 F.2d at 1155-56 (reversing district court's dismissal of
claim in which tying defendants controlled 57% of market in the tying product); Monument
Builders of Greater Kan. City, Inc. v. Am. Cemetery Ass'n, 629 F. Supp. 1002, 1008 (D. Kan.
1986), affd in part, rev'd in part, 891 F.2d 1473 (10th Cir. 1989) (dismissing claim of
horizontal tying conspiracy in which defendants controlled 70-75% of market in the tying
product).
233. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1291 (2006).
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market power, they should focus on aggregate market shares, not
individual ones.23 4
Finally, if even market definition and power are not a formal
element, market power still remains salient in tying conspiracy
litigation. A private plaintiff seeking a monetary remedy would still
have to prove damages. If the conspirators lack market power, their
agreement is unlikely to inflict antitrust injury. Thus, market power
will continue to play a role in suits challenging tying conspiracies.
But that role differs dramatically from the role that market power
plays in traditional tying cases. The most important difference is
that, in proving the damages suffered as a result of the tying
conspiracy, neither the plaintiff nor the court need go through the
process of market definition, which is generally required to prove
market power in unilateral tying litigation but unnecessary in the
context of proving damages caused by a tying conspiracy. While
plaintiffs seeking merely to enjoin a tying conspiracy would not have
to prove market power in any instance, absent market power, there
is little likelihood of tying conspirators without market power being
sued or held accountable for antitrust damages.
2. Coercion
Although the present legal test for tying arrangement requires
coercion,"' it is unnecessary when the cause of action is concerted
tying. Coercion is an important element when analyzing unilaterally
imposed tie-ins in order to distinguish between beneficial and
anticompetitive tying arrangements. Coercion is less important
when what is being challenged is the agreement among competitors
that distorted the options that should have been available in a free
market absent the tying conspiracy. The agreement supplants the
need for a separate coercion element.236 The fact that competitors
have agreed to impose a burdensome term-whether price or tying
234. See supra Part IV.E (discussing aggregation of market shares for purposes of applying
the Jefferson Parish safe harbor).
235. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984), abrogated in part
on other grounds by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1284 (2006).
236. The inquiry into coercion is satisfied by the plaintiffs burden of proving that the
defendants agreed to condition their sales of the tying product on buyers agreeing to purchase
the tied product as well. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 24, at 410 (3d ed. 2005) (noting that
conditioning can satisfy the coercion requirement).
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-suffices to show illegality. Indeed, for the purposes of liability,
there is no need to show that the conspirators actually made sales
subject to a tying requirement because it is the agreement that is
the antitrust violation.237 Whether and how the tie-in was imposed
is relevant to individual damages, but not necessary for liability.
The element of coercion has proven particularly powerful in class
action litigation challenging tying arrangements. Class certification
is sometimes denied because each member of the class must prove
that he was individually coerced to accept the tying requirement.
However, if there is a tying conspiracy, then class members should
not have to prove coercion as such.23 Just as class action suits
challenging horizontal price-fixing do not have to prove coercion,
neither should class members arguing that sellers have engaged in
a tying conspiracy.
3. Anticompetitive Effects
Finally, some jurisdictions require that the plaintiffs demonstrate
that a challenged tying arrangement had anticompetitive effects.23s
Besides the fact that this requirement is inconsistent with the
functioning of a true per se rule in which anticompetitive effects are
presumed as a matter of law, it is unnecessary in cases of tying
conspiracies. The potential anticompetitive effects of traditional
tying arrangements are significantly magnified when multiple firms
agree to impose tying requirements. Competitors would have no
reason to conspire unless there was a significant likelihood of
anticompetitive effects. Thus, the proof of an agreement among
tying conspirators should also be sufficient to relieve the plain-
tiff-whether it be the government or a private plaintiff-from any
obligation to prove anticompetitive effects.240
237. Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 453 n.13 (3d Cir. 1977) ("If plaintiffs had
direct evidence of conspiracy, it would be unnecessary to prove that each defendant actually
imposed the tie-in upon its lessees, only that each agreed to do so.").
238. Jennings Oil Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 80 F.R.D. 124, 129 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) ("Moreover,
plaintiffs have alleged, in addition to the existence of a tie-in, a Conspiracy to impose a tie-in,
which raises questions common to the entire putative class." (emphasis added)).
239. See, e.g., Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale Coll., 237 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 2000).
240. See Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 330 (1991) (noting that "because the
essence of any violation of § 1 is the illegal agreement itself-rather than the overt acts
performed in furtherance of it-proper analysis focuses not on actual consequences, but rather
upon the potential harm that would ensue if the conspiracy were successful"); Multiflex, Inc.
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CONCLUSION
Antitrust jurisprudence is built upon a fundamental distinction
between unilateral and concerted action. Tying law stands out as an
anomaly for failing to engage in this critical antitrust inquiry. The
law recognizes no formal distinction between unilateral and
concerted tying arrangements. Yet, tying conspiracies are funda-
mentally different than unilateral tying arrangements. Tying
conspiracies represent a far greater potential threat to competition
than do conventional unilateral tying arrangements. Whereas
competition provides for lower prices, higher quality, and better
services, tying conspiracies eliminate aspects of competition and
stifle the market's ability to achieve these ends. Tying conspiracies
can prevent new entrants from breaking into the market, allow the
firms to police an existing price-fixing cartel or simply raise market
prices through more tacit collusion, and reduce consumer choice in
a manner inconsistent with antitrust principles. Despite this, in
some ways current law gives greater latitude to concerted tying
arrangements than unilaterally imposed tying arrangements. As a
result, antitrust law may simultaneously condemn innocuous tie-ins
while permitting some tying conspiracies that pose serious
anticompetitive threats.
Although courts and scholars debate whether and when defen-
dants can advance a legitimate business justification defense for
unilaterally imposed tying arrangements, such defenses have no
place when plaintiffs challenge a horizontal tying conspiracy.
Concerted tying arrangements have no redeeming virtues. Even if
a particular firm has a legitimate business rationale for unilaterally
imposing a tie-in, it has no legitimate reason to agree with its
competitor to impose such a tie-in. Like other per se illegal conduct,
it is this agreement that is the violation. It is appropriate for
antitrust jurisprudence to recognize tying conspiracies as inherently
anticompetitive and worthy of per se condemnation.
v. Samuel Moore & Co., 709 F.2d 980, 986 (5th Cir. 1983) ("Under the Sherman Act,
conspiring in restraint of trade is illegal, even if the conspiracy does not in fact lead to an
actual restraint of trade.... [A] conspiracy violates the Sherman Act even without proof of
injury because of the surreptitious, pernicious effect a conspiracy ultimately can have upon
a free market." (citation omitted)).
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